All posts by mlamnini

Foreign Takeovers of Canadian/Quebec Corporations:

The recent offer by US-based Lowes to acquire Rona, occurring as it did in the midst of the Quebec election campaign, has triggered calls for actions to protect the ownership of Rona. Quebec political parties took strong positions against the takeover, ranging from changing corporate laws to pooling funds to acquire a blocking stake in the company (and others). The furor fizzled out as Lowes dropped its offer (for now anyway).

However the issue remains current as an investor seeks to replace the whole board with new members presumably more open than the current board to a sale of the company […] Read more

Rona puts up legal barrier to Invesco board challenge

“[…] Invesco bought the bulk of its current Rona stake in May 2007 at a price varying between $17.10 and $17.75 per share so its current state of mind is understandable given the share drop since then, said Yvan Allaire, executive chair of Montreal’s Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations.

Still, Invesco backed Rona’s board last May even as the share price plumbed historic lows, Mr. Allaire noted. The reason it opposes the board now is that there’s a willing suitor to buy Rona, namely Lowe’s, giving it a chance to recoup some of its investment.

Regardless, the complete ouster of Rona’s entire board is unwarranted, said Mr. Allaire. “It’s as if nobody on the board merits that we keep their experience and knowledge of the company and its circumstances.”

Rona has not received a formal request for a meeting from Invesco, said Rona spokeswoman Michelle Laberge.

The fact it called the annual meeting for next May on Wednesday changes nothing because even under the obligation of the request, Rona would have the power to pick any date for a shareholder meeting before June next year, she said.

Ms. Laberge said that Rona wants to avoid a proxy fight. Company chairman Robert Paré has been intensifying the number of meetings with shareholders in recent days in an attempt to address concerns about the company’s performance, she said.

Head-hunting firm Korn/ Ferry International, which Rona hired to find a new CEO after the dismissal of Robert Dutton last week, also has a mandate to help search for board member candidates, Ms. Laberge said.

Rona has been criticized in the past, most recently at its annual meeting this past summer, for having a Quebec-centric board despite the fact it operates Canada-wide. Only one of its 11 current directors, James Pantelidis, is based outside the province.” Read more

Notes on a flawed study

In October 2012, Investor Responsibility Research (IRRC) Institute and ISS, the proxy management firm, jointly published a study purporting to assess the relative performance of controlled companies listed on exchanges in the United States (the S&P 1500 Composite Index).

The study has received little notice in the Canadian media (but for the Globe and Mail, October 4th 2012) but circulates widely in the financial community as its «findings» buttress the prejudice against dual class share structures.

Unfortunately, that study is sloppy in design, amateurish and misleading in its statistics, biased in its interpretation and irrelevant for Canadian companies. Had that report been submitted as a term paper by first-year MBA students, it would have received a fail grade […] Read more

A Reply to Conrad Black

«As Quebec decays, Toronto seizes greatness» is the latest epistle of Conrad Black wherein he vents his disdain for Quebec in general and its «separatists» in most virulent particular. (The National Post, October 6th 2012)

The affront pains coming from a man of Black’s experience, indeed a man who suffered the lashes of unjust accusations and the «monstrosity of bigoted ignorance» (as he describes Judge Posner in the chronicle of his legal ordeal A Matter of Principle).

Yet, his text is most striking indeed for its ignorance, bigoted perhaps, biased certainly. It proposes a musty description of a Quebec where Black last spent time, it seems, in the 1950s. His tirade is of the sort that gets energetic nods of approval from fellow members at plush country clubs, the same setting where the inanities of Romney are embraced with comradely enthusiasm.

Tiresome task it is to compile Black’s errors of facts and expletives but let’s single out a few juicy ones:

  • «..a demographically dwindling repository of a not overly dynamic French fact and which by its addiction to transfer payments from English Canada has become a white collar secular clerisy that contributes little economic added value to anything. That’s a bit much even by Black’s standard of tactlessness, verisimilitude and lack of balance. All provinces receive federal transfer payments (Ontario, $19.3 billion in 2012-2013; Quebec, $17.3 billion; Alberta, $3.3 billion, etc.). Black’s outrage must be driven by «equalization payments». It might come as a surprise to Black that Ontario also receives equalization payments ($3.3 billion in 2012-2013) and Quebec’s $7.8 billion for equalization represents a mere 12% of the Quebec government’s budget. The per capita level of equalization payment ranges from $249 for Ontario, $943 for Quebec, $1368 for Manitoba, $1992 for New Brunswick. «English Canada» does support other parts of «English Canada» too; so the white collar clerisy must be a Canadian phenomenon
  • Electricity, over-unionized base metals and forest products industries, and a scattering of high tech and financial services are all that generate any earned income for Quebec now..; perhaps nostalgic for the Duplessis era when French-Canadians were kept in their proper place, Black has not yet heard of CAE, Bombardier, Pratt and Whitney, CGI, Le Cirque du Soleil, Alimentation Couche Tard, Garda, SNC-Lavalin, Canadian National Railways, or perhaps Polytron, Talented Frogs Studio, etc..
  • «… Quebec is placing further strictures on the teaching of English in the state school system, a terrible disservice to the province…; here he goes again; perhaps, the most eloquent rebuttal to this charge is the following notice on the web site of the Ministère de l’éducation du Québec : «Come and teach English in Québec» […] Read more

Rona shareholders first victims of Quebec’s growing protectionism

” […] Like the PQ, the CAQ is intent on keeping corporate headquarters in the province intact after a rash of buyouts in recent years hollowed out local decision-making at companies such as Alcan and Molson. They argue head office power means jobs for local accountants and bankers and suppliers, a whole ecosystem of employment that Quebec has slowly bled over the years to other jurisdictions such as Toronto.

“It’s important that we build wealth in Quebec, that we reverse our poor standing in Canada,” CAQ leader François Legault said Tuesday, adding his party would support the PQ government agenda on a case by case basis.

How would the parties shelter corporate Quebec? First, by strengthening the legal power of boards to assess unwanted bids for their companies. As governance expert Yvan Allaire argues, the Quebec government’s vocal opposition to a Lowe’s takeover of Rona was a necessary warning shot because corporate takeover defences are weak in Canada. Give directors more power to say no and politicians won’t need to intervene.

The PQ and the CAQ also have plans for the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec […] Read more

Do your shares have the power?

[ … ]

Yvan Allaire, chairman of the board of the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations (IGPPO) and a professor emeritus at Universite du Quebec a Montreal, estimated that 13 per cent of the 253 companies on the TSX/S&P composite index in 2008 had some form of dual-class voting structure.

For the last three decades, any company choosing to list on the TSX must include some sort of “coattail” provision that protects the lesser-voting shareholders. In essence, it says that the terms of any sale of the super-voting shares must be offered to all shareholders. Magna was one of roughly a dozen companies on the TSX that are grandfathered in and need not abide by that clause.

[ … ]

Hot-button issues

Yvan Allaire, in a paper earlier this year for the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, listed questions directors should ask before joining the board of a company with a dual-class share structure. The questions also would serve potential shareholders:

1. What is the nature of the difference between the share classes?

  • Do both classes have full rights to vote, differing only in the number of votes to which they are entitled?
  • Is there a class without voting rights?
  • Is there a provision allowing the class of shares with inferior voting rights to elect a number of board members?
  • Are both classes of shares traded on stock exchanges and, if so, how are they valued by the market?

2. Does the company have a strong coattail provision in place to protect minority shareholders in the event of the controlling shareholder selling his/her interest?

3. How does the controlling shareholder’s voting power compare with his/her economic interest?

Read more

Quebec’s move to shield Rona from Lowe’s takeover could end badly

[…] “Yvan Allaire, chairman of the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations, argues that the real rationale for Quebec’s meddling in Rona is to counter the difficulty, under current securities regulations, for the company’s board to reject a hostile takeover attempt. That compares with the United States, where boards have more power under state laws.

“It’s relatively easy in Canada to put a company into play, at which point the end result is likely that it is going to be sold to the hostile bidder or to another third party,” said Max Rogan, a mergers and acquisitions specialist at McCarthy Tétrault in Montreal.

PQ leader Pauline Marois is proposing to change that situation to give Quebec boards more power in a takeover situation. She opposes the Lowe’s takeover. The other main candidate for premier in the election, Coalition Avenir Québec leader François Legault, has come out against both Lowe’s offer for Rona and Bell’s bid for Astral. He says too many of Quebec’s corporate head offices have been lost.

The political intensity surrounding the Rona takeover will die down after the election, said one veteran Toronto analyst. But if either the PQ or the CAQ wins, all bets are off.

Trumping everything is the fact the outlook for the Canadian renovation industry remains depressed. Consumers are saddled with debt, employment growth is slow and inflation is expected to come back at a time wages aren’t dramatically improving.

“Regardless of what the outcome is — Lowe’s versus Rona — the outlook for the industry is bleak,” the Toronto analyst said. “Rona isn’t going to be able to avoid that. It’s too big.”” … Read more

Rona battle highlights impotence of boards: Prof

“Quebec-based home improvement retailer Rona Inc. (RON.TO 10.93 -0.08 -0.73%) has found itself in the crosshairs of an unsolicited takeover approach from its American rival Lowe’s Cos (LOW.N 45.14 0.51 1.14%) — even as Rona’s board and management have publicly stated they’re not interested.

For Yvan Allaire, Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations chair and professor at UQAM, the hostile takeover proposal highlights a glaring weakness in corporate Canada: powerless boards.

“Once the board in Canada says no to a transaction, it means almost nothing. If it were in the U.S. and the board says no to a would-be acquirer that would be the end of it,” he says. “We have in Canada situation when the board is virtually impotent when faced with hostile takeovers.”

He says that while shareholders “have rights… that doesn’t mean the board is without any power to use its business judgment when faced with a decision like this.”

“The question being raised by this Rona transaction…[is that] there are serious concerns in Canada that we are a totally free-for-all for transactions by foreign companies without any protection and without the board being able to evaluate this transaction because it’s essentially powerless. It is a Canadian problem.””

Read more

The real Rona lesson: Update takeover rules

In the U.S. when the board says no to a would-be acquisitor, the matter is largely settled.

English-Canadian media are in a tizzy. The Quebec government wants to block the takeover of Rona by the American Lowe’s Cos. Inc. Nationalistic impudence, misguided tampering with financial markets, jingoistic economic policies — the salvo of epithets has been astonishing.

Yet, they’re all missing the point. Rona has adopted an obsolete ownership model (one share, one vote, etc.) that puts its fate in the hands of speculators, share-swappers, arbitrage funds and hedge funds. It is subjected to a set of rules governing takeovers in Canada written and enforced by securities commissions, which rules have no equivalent in the United States, the shining champion of free markets.

Let’s see how this works.

First, if Rona had put in place a capital structure with a dual class of shares, say like Canadian Tire, a takeover without the consent of the board and the controlling shareholders would be impossible. No need for any government to intervene.

Second, if Rona had a staggered board (that is, only one third of board members stand for election each year, a rarity in Canada), as do many U.S. corporations, the board could easily resist the unwanted advances of a corporate suitor. No need for the government to intervene.

Third, let’s suppose that Canada, like several U.S. states, had by law given boards of directors the legal authority to assess unwanted bids for their companies, take into account the interest of all stakeholders (including shareholders) and just say no, if in their considered judgment a transaction is not in the best interest of the company. Remember the board of Rona said “No, thank you” to Lowe’s. The Quebec government is not going against the will of the board.

Remember how the attempted acquisition of the Iowa-based convenience store chain Casey’s by Quebec’s Alimentation Couche Tard was thwarted by the board acting fully within the purview of Iowa business laws. No economic jingoism here and no need for the government to intervene.

But wait. The Canadian Business Corporation Act actually says that: “Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall (a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation; (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court of Canada, in two important decisions, set out what that clause means. In the BCE case: “The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation originated in the common law. It is a duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. Often the interests of shareholders and stakeholders are co-extensive with the interests of the corporation. But if they conflict, the directors’ duty is clear — it is to the corporation.”

And, in Peoples v. Wise: “We accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”

But Canadian securities commissions have taken it upon themselves to promulgate and enforce rules that essentially scrap this responsibility of the board, though clearly spelled out by the Supreme Court. For instance, in the United States, poison pills, a most effective tool to resist unwanted takeovers, are commonly used and may have a long life. In Canada, as per our securities commissions, poison pills have a limited life (45 to 60 days) and merely serve as an interlude for the board to try to get a better offer (though the securities commissions have lately become somewhat more flexible).

An article published in the Financial Post on Feb. 8 by Julius Melnitzer (Canadian firms easy targets for takeovers) reports on how a number of Canadian senior legal counsels view the matter: “ ‘In a nutshell, the target board is in a much stronger position in the U.S. than it is in Canada,’ says Manny Pressman of Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP’s Toronto office. ‘That’s because takeover defences are much stronger in the U.S. and because U.S. courts give enormous respect to directors’ business decisions and judgments regarding hostile bids, whereas Canadian courts and regulators treat them as virtually inconsequential ….

“ ‘In Canada, it’s almost certain that a target that becomes the subject of a hostile bid will be sold …. In the U.S., it’s very difficult to buy a company that’s not for sale.’ ”

That is the point. In the U.S. when the board says no to a would-be acquisitor, the matter is largely settled (more so in some U.S. states than in others). No political interference needed on a case-by-case basis, as the relevant business acts have done the job.

In Canada, it is high time to bring the regulation of takeovers in line with Canadian laws and Supreme Court judgments, to give back to boards of directors the authority to make the judgment calls on these matters.

That’s what Rona is all about.

FP Letters to the Editor: Small firms need options as incentives

Re: “Stock Options Under Attack,” Barbara Shecter, May 23

Rewarding executives with stock options may be a mistake in some circles, as claimed by the Institute for the Governance of Private and Public Organizations, but they are essential tools to attract and retain skilled management in many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

Companies that have yet to generate enough profit to compete for top talent with cash remuneration can provide incentives for employees at all levels through stock options. Concerns about short-term horizons and decisions driven by the immediate expected impact on the company’s share price can be mitigated by the judicious use of vesting and hold periods.

There are many issues surrounding executive compensation and overuse of stock options is just one of them. Eliminating them altogether won’t resolve the fundamental problems cited in the article with respect to “social trust, loyalty and reciprocity,” but it will make it much more difficult for SMEs to create sufficient incentives for senior executives or managers to join companies that have yet to realize their full potential.

Robert Cook, president, CNSX ­Markets, Toronto” … Read more

Executive compensation

The policy paper, entitled “Pay for Value: Cutting the Gordian Knot of Executive Compensation“.  prepared by Professor Yvan Allaire for the working group on compensation of IGOPP, noted that, “We are making a series of recommendations about the complex and emotionally charged issue of executive compensation. We hope that our analysis and recommendations will prove a valuable contribution to what has become the most salient and vexing governance issue.”

Included in the study are five strategic policy recommendations for boards of directors. The policy paper recommends the gradual elimination of stock options, questions the standard practice of setting executive compensation on the basis of what “comparable” companies pay their executives, and calls on boards of directors to maintain executive compensation within a reasonable range of what is paid to other employees in the company.

The policy paper examines the evolution of Canadian executive compensation since 1998. It notes that the compensation of Canadian CEOs has now reached parity with their American counterparts. The policy paper provides the historical context of compensation and describes the divergent perspectives of the key stakeholders: investors, executives, boards, governments and society at large. It flags the risks created by some forms of compensation and stresses the need for fundamental changes in current compensation practices.

The working group of IGOPP was created in September 2011 to formulate recommendations on executive compensation. The group was chaired by Yvan Allaire and included IGOPP board members: Paule Doré, Stephen Jarislowksy, Michel Magnan, Robert Parizeau, Gulyaine Saucier, and Sebastian Van Berkom. The policy position was approved by the IGOPP board in March 2012.

Canadian companies urged to end stock option rewards

“An influential group including representatives of Canada’s business, regulatory and academic circles is calling for an end to the “mistake” of rewarding executives with stock options.

The Institute for the Governance of Private and Public Organizations issued the bold challenge Tuesday as part of package of recommendations aimed at reining in executive pay and tying compensation firmly to long-term strategy execution.

A 64-page policy paper produced by the Institute concludes that it was “a major mistake, and a source of many shenanigans” to make stock options a large component of executive compensation.

“We are convinced that a modicum of social trust, loyalty and reciprocity must be rebuilt in publicly traded companies, and that management must manage for the long-term benefit of the corporation and its varied stakeholders,” the report says. “We are also convinced that this will not happen without fundamental changes in the compensation models currently in use in most companies.”

The use of options proliferated in the 1990s after changes were made to the deductibility of executive salaries in the United States. But options have come under heavy criticism in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis because they are seen by some as a culprit in creating the excessive risk-taking blamed for the meltdown and ensuing economic woes” … Read more

Counterpoint: Resist the U.S. hedge-fund invasion

Usually, they just extract cash, spin off units or sell the company.

A typically Canadian storyline has become conventional wisdom to ­explain the Canadian Pacific saga.

Clubby Canadian board members, comfortable with the status quo and reluctant to rock the boat, lest they diminish their attractiveness as corporate directors, watch passively as shareholder value is destroyed by incompetent management. Institutional investors, pension funds in particular, hide their dissatisfaction behind a facade of “good” governance with ever more finicky demands for marginal improvements of the “say-on-pay” sort.

Fortunately, at last comes the swashbuckling American in shining armour to right the wrongs inflicted on the long-suffering Canadian shareholders.

While there may be some kernels of truth in this description, it draws misinformed distinctions between the American and the Canadian financial systems. Indeed, corporate governance suffers from a surfeit of rules, guidelines and principles, often pushed or imposed on boards of directors by “proxy advisor” outfits. But that is not a Canadian phenomenon, as these outfits have been created first and foremost for the American market.

It may surprise Canadians that, in spite of the persistent demands of investors in the U.S., American corporations and their boards still enjoy a lot more protection from activist investors and takeover artists than Canadian companies do.

A third of the S&P 500 companies still have staggered boards (that is, only a third of board members are up for election each year). Staggered boards are practically non-existent in Canada. If CP had a staggered board, it could have basically sent Pershing Square, its critic, up the proverbial creek. Only five board members would have been up for election this year and perhaps none of those targeted in the proxy fight!

Only 41% of S&P 500 companies have separate chair and CEO positions, and in many cases that chairperson is not an independent member but the former CEO; fully 85% of Canadian companies have adopted this principle, an important one in situations of conflicts with shareholders.

Legislative actions in some 30 U.S states in the Land of Free Markets have enhanced the power of the board to resist unwanted takeovers, and assorted hostile manoeuvres against the company. These legislations vary from state to state, but they all aim at shifting the balance of power to the board of directors.

There is no equivalent in Canada. Once a company is put in play, protective measures are few and of short duration; they are basically designed to give the board the time to shop around for a better offer.

The only distinctive measure of protection for significant companies in Canada is provided by their adoption of dual-class structures of shareholding, a model that is finding a good many adepts in the United States among the founders of high-tech companies such as Google and Facebook.

The claim that hedge funds may be playing a benign, beneficial role by prodding complacent companies to perform better in the long run is not supported by empirical research. For instance, a study of 130 cases of hedge-fund interventions found that these funds usually requested that companies implement one of four types of actions:

Selling the company.

Unbundling Here the funds push the company to get rid of specific “underperforming” or unrelated subsidiaries or divisions by selling them or spinning them off.

Disgorging cash Here the game plan is to force the company to use any “excess” cash, or to leverage the company’s balance sheet, to buy back shares or increase dividend payments.

Changing strategy and governance Hedge funds, in these cases, become expert at running companies. They will offer specific criticisms of the current management and strategy, and argue for a change in direction and game plan; they will ask for board representation to influence the management and strategy of the company. Of course, these hedge funds often end up creating turmoil, uncertainty and conflict within the company.

It is highly doubtful that Canada would be well served by the large-scale importation of these short-term stratagems and “greed-is-good” artists.

By the way, given that the American financial system is replete with these “activist” hedge funds, one is at a loss to explain the dismal arrangements that brought their financial system, and the global one, within a hair’s breadth of total collapse in 2008, or the fact that over the last 10 years, sedate, complacent Canadian companies have produced a shareholder return of some 54.8% (TSX 60 index), while the S&P 500 companies, watched and prodded by activist funds, managed to deliver only 28.3% during the same period.

Go figure!

Opinions expressed herein are those of the author only.