All posts by mlamnini

Who should pick board members?

Proxy access by shareholders raises numerous issues and potential adverse effects on governance

The traditional view of corporate governance, anchored in law and customs, grants to the board of directors, once elected by shareholders, the responsibility of making all decisions in the interest of the corporation. That responsibility and accountability include, inter alia, appointing senior management and setting their compensation, declaring dividends, nominating board members for election, approving strategic orientations and budgets.

Recently, the prerogative to nominate the members of corporate boards, which has historically been the sole responsibility of incumbent directors, is now challenged by institutional investors determined to acquire the right, under certain conditions, to nominate their own candidates. The challenge to this board prerogative is called proxy access by shareholders to the director nomination process.

The SEC introduced new regulations in August 2010 which allowed shareholders holding at least 3 per cent of a public corporation’s shares, and having held these shares for at least 3 years, to propose nominees to the board (for up to a maximum of 25 per cent of the members of the existing board).

This new regulation was immediately challenged in the courts and had to be withdrawn when struck down. However, an amendment to the general regulation of shareholder proposals allowed shareholders to submit proposals on proxy access rules, which, if adopted by a majority of shareholders, were to be made part of the corporation’s by-laws.

This change provoked a tsunami of proposals from U.S. institutional investors calling for the right to put forth their own nominees for the board.

This access to voting proxies by shareholders is fast becoming a part of the governance landscape in the United States; it is very unlikely that major corporations will try to oppose the movement as institutional investors are fiercely supportive of this new “right.” However, the eventual impact of these initiatives on corporate governance remains to be assessed.

Corporations will try to preventively replace directors to avoid conflicts with large shareholders

In Canada, this issue has recently taken on a higher profile in the context of a consultation conducted by Industry Canada on the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), one purpose of which was precisely to consider this issue of proxy access. All the institutional investors who expressed views came out in favour of greater access to the nominating process by shareholders, while the law firms and organizations representing the business community advocated against this initiative.

The Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG) recently issued a policy paper in favour of proxy access, taking a rather striking position as it shuns any minimum period of shareholding to obtain access to the nominating process. Thus, the CCGG policy position should provoke a vigorous debate on this issue in Canada.

Whatever the substance and merit of the arguments in favour of proxy access by shareholders, this initiative brings forth a host of issues related to the logistics of its application and the potential adverse effects on governance and board dynamics.

Among the arguments supposedly supportive of shareholder access to the nominating process, one is particularly noxious: the notion that “fear” among board members of being singled out for replacement would lead to higher level of board performance.

Indeed, the consequences for an individual director of being voted out of a board would be very significant and painful, both in economic and reputational terms; this is true for both incumbent nominees and the new nominees proposed by the shareholders.

Faced with the risk and arbitrary nature of a contested election, the directors would try to promote their personal contributions with institutional investors, thus generating an unhealthy competition among colleagues. In any event, how would the shareholders, called upon to choose between several nominees, decide for which nominee to vote, which nominee to dismiss when the voting proxy contains more nominees than available seats?

Will smaller institutional funds rely on proxy voting consultants (such as ISS or Glass Lewis), again increasing by tenfold their influence on the governance of public corporations? These proxy voting consultants will propose, as per their usual practice, some obvious, measurable criteria to make this choice: age of the directors, number of years as a member of the board, etc., which are, in fact, arbitrary criteria, uncorrelated with actual performance.

Once these criteria are well understood, it is likely that corporations will try to preventively replace directors to avoid conflicts with large shareholders and make rooms for their nominees. Therefore, directors would be shown the way out because they no longer satisfy the arbitrary criteria selected by proxy voting advisors without taking into account their actual contribution.

Even more likely, boards of directors will initiate discussions and negotiations with institutional investors who have indicated their intention to propose their own nominees in an effort to reach common ground; the result of such secret negotiations will often be that some of the nominees proposed by institutional investors will become the nominees of management, thus resulting in the forcible retirement of directors presumably viewed, more or less deservedly, as being weaker.

Moreover, the process may be hijacked. Groups of shareholders who champion specific causes (e.g., social, environmental or religious) may use this new “right” to nominate board candidates who espouse their priorities, to the possible detriment of other stakeholders of the corporation.
Obviously, if, as suggested by the CCGG, no minimum holding period were required for shareholders to be given access to the nomination process, that would open the door wide to “activist” hedge funds – or any other form of short-term investors. These funds could then play their usual games with great ease and at much lower costs than under their current business model. That would not benefit the long-term interests of Canadian corporations but may well benefit investors in the short term.

For such reasons, we contend that shareholder proxy access is ill-advised and may result in negative effects on governance practices.

We recommend that nomination committees of boards of directors implement a robust consultation process with the corporation’s significant shareholders and report in the annual Management Information Circular on the process and criteria adopted for nominating any new director.

Allaire & Dauphin on hedge fund activism

Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin return to a topic on which they have been active and important commentators and analysts; namely, hedge fund activism. Specifically, they report on a new study they conducted:

”We … explored, among other things, the consequences of activism over time when compared to a random sample of firms with similar characteristics at the time of intervention.

Focusing on activist events of the years 2010 and 2011, we obtained a sample of 290 campaigns initiated by 165 activist hedge funds which targeted 259 distinct firms. To map out the actions and performance of these 259 targeted companies, we have set up a random sample of 259 companies selected to match the targeted companies at the intervention year in terms of industry classification and market value”.

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The Game of “Activist” Hedge Funds: Cui Bono ?

Over the last few years, hedge fund activism has received a great deal of coverage in financial media (and in the mainstream press), has triggered heated debates and been the focus of much academic research. Saviour of capitalism for some, for others, activist hedge funds are but mongers of short-term tactics which eventually damage business corporations[1].

Academic research on the topic mostly focused on the short-term returns surrounding the intervention date, and the few ones that examined the longer-term relationship with performance were often marred by various methodological issues. Coffee and Palia (2014), among others, beseeched researchers on activism for a change of focus: “Future research needs to focus more specifically on where activism causes real changes in firm value and where it does not.”[2] We took on the challenge and explored, among other things, the consequences of activism over time when compared to a random sample of firms with similar characteristics at the time of intervention.

Focusing on activist events of the years 2010 and 2011, we obtained a sample of 290 campaigns initiated by 165 activist hedge funds which targeted 259 distinct firms. To map out the actions and performance of these 259 targeted companies, we have set up a random sample of 259 companies selected to match the targeted companies at the intervention year in terms of industry classification and market value.

This study brings to light a number of facts and some compelling evidence.

We found that the best way, bar none, for the activists to make money for their funds is to get the company sold off or substantial assets spun-off. No less than 81 targeted companies (or 31%) were sold off, a much larger percentage than occurred in the matched random sample (14%). Figure 1 shows a survival rate for the targeted firms of 63% four years after the intervention, as compared to 84% for the random sample of firms.

Figure 1. Survival rate of firms at year end: activist vs. random, base 100 at t-1

Figure 1- CLS blog-Activist

Survival rate of firms at year end: activist vs. random, base 100 at t-1. The survival rate represents the percentage of firms that were still actively listed at year end (thus excluding firms that were delisted, liquidated of filed for chapter 11, and firms that were either sold or merged).

The evidence is pretty clear that the much vaunted “improvements” in operating performance (ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q) result mainly from some basic financial manoeuvres (selling assets, cutting capital expenditures, buying back shares, etc.).

However, there is no evidence of deterioration in performance over a three-year period. That is not a result that owes much to the forbearance of activists. Business firms tend to be resilient and their management adaptive to the new reality of activists’ requirements. If the targeted firm can survive the holding period of the activist (more than a third will not), then, and only then, will they be able to start managing again for the longer term.

In general, the stock’s performance of targeted companies over a three-year span barely matches the performance of a random sample of companies[3]. But the activist hedge funds, by timing their entry and exit of a stock, by using derivatives and leverage on occasion to enhance their yield, by benefiting from the “control” premium on getting companies sold off, may well achieve highly positive results.

For targeted companies, the most immediate consequence is the likelihood of being sold off. For other targeted companies, this hedge fund episode often results in change of senior management and board members (Figure 2), stagnation of assets (Figure 3) and R&D.

Figure 2.  Turnover Rate of CEOs

Figure 2-CLS-activistJPG

Figure 3. Median Results (surviving firms), Total Assets (t-2 = 100)

Figure 3-CLS activist

While not lethal over the short period of time that these hedge funds hang around, many companies may come out of the experience as shrunken firms that may have lost a couple of years to their competitors.

The most fundamental issue raised by the phenomenon of hedge fund activism is the crucial assumption that underpins their activities (or at the very least underpins the arguments of their supporters), that is: “Outsiders analyzing financial data from afar can determine that a company is not managed so as to maximize value for its shareholders and that some specific actions they have identified should be taken that would benefit shareholders and would be in the long-term interest of the company.”

Indeed, the argument is made that the cuts in R&D and capital expenditures are applied only to those projects that have no economic justification, that the allocation of cash resources to buy back shares is a better use than some misguided capital investment; of course selling the company (or splitting it up) provides the best outcome for the company and contributes to the overall efficiency of the economic system.

An essential corollary of this “argument” has to be that, in many instances which activists are particularly adept at spotting, management and boards of directors are incompetent, complacent, lack foresight and are unable to act in a manner that serves the best interest of their company. Given the very small size of most companies targeted by hedge funds, that may occur more readily.

But to accept that occurrence as a general rule would be misguided. It would seem a bit unusual that managers, despite their large stock-related compensation, would, with the blessing of their board of directors, waste or misspend R&D funds and capital; until, that is, a wise, better informed activist hedge fund manager comes around to point out the errors of their way.

Either that concept of the business world is accurate, then the whole system of governance of publicly listed businesses must be scrapped and shareholders should call the shot directly and give their marching orders to management; or that view is wrong and management and boards of directors know best what is in the long-term interest of the company. That is a clear choice and one that underpins much of the divergent views on the role and impact of activist hedge funds.

While activist hedge funds (and a number of academics, sheltered by reams of data) have a stake in the first point of view, business people and those whose jobs bring them in close contact with the real world of business tend to partake of the second point of view.

This research does not provide any evidence of the superior strategic sagacity of hedge fund managers but does point to their keen understanding of what moves stock prices in the short term. Indeed, in none of the 259 cases studied here did hedge funds make proposals of a strategic nature to enhance the long-term performance of the firm.

That should concern society, governments, pension funds and other institutional investors with pretension of a long-term investment horizon.

ENDNOTES

[1] See “The case for and against activist hedge funds”, by Yvan Allaire (2015), for a detailed discussion.

[2] See John C. Coffee, Jr., and Darius Palia, “The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence and Implications”, ECGI Law Working Paper, No. 266/2014, September 2014, p.82.

[3] We found no statistically significant mean differences between the two groups.

Yes, Short-Termism Really Is a Problem

With Hillary Clinton’s tax proposals to encourage longer-term investing, the debate over whether American business is too fixated on the short term has moved from the dimly lit offices of earnest policy wonks into the klieg lights of U.S. primary season. Lots of commentators have jumped into the fray to declare that there is — or isn’t — a problem with short-termism, waving research studies of varying age and relevance.

Somewhat ironically, many engaging in the discussion seem to think that the issue itself has a short history. But that is far from true. Thirty years ago, no less a business guru than Peter Drucker weighed in, skewering short-termism in a Wall Street Journal editorial. “Everyone who has worked with American management can testify that the need to satisfy the pension fund manager’s quest for higher earnings next quarter, together with the panicky fear of the raider, constantly pushes top managements toward decisions they know to be costly, if not suicidal, mistakes,” he wrote.

One reason the question of short-termism still hasn’t been settled is that the answer is fundamentally unknowable. There is no control group; we can’t compare the performance of America with short-termism to that of America devoid of short-termism — or even prove beyond a doubt that short-termism exists in the first place.

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The Case For And Against Activist Hedge Funds

Activist hedge funds can count on a number of supporters in academia and in the media rising up in defense of their actions. No doubt activist hedge funds have found their most persistent academic supporters in Professor Lucian Bebchuk of the Harvard Law School and his co-authors. In several papers, but most particularly in the Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang (2013) paper, the authors make several claims, which are summarized in Bebchuk’s op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal:

“Our comprehensive analysis examines a universe of about 2,000 hedge fund interventions during the period of 1994-2007 and tracks companies for five years following an activist’s arrival. We find that:

  • During the five-year period following activist interventions, operating performance relative to peers improves consistently through the end of the period;
  • The initial stock price spike following the arrival of activists is not reversed in the long term, as opponents assert, and does not fail to reflect the long-term consequences of activism;
  • The long-term effects of hedge fund activism are positive even when one focuses on the types of activism that are most resisted and criticized – first, those that lower or constrain long-term investments by enhancing leverage, beefing up shareholder payouts, or reducing capital expenditures; and second, adversarial interventions employing hostile tactics;
  • The “pump-and-dump” claim that activists bail out before negative stock returns arrive is not supported by the data; and
  • Contrary to opponents’ beliefs, companies targeted by activists in the years preceding the financial crisis were not made more vulnerable to the subsequent downturn.”
    (Wall Street Journal, August 8th, 2013).

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Can A New Paradigm For Corp Governance End A 30 Years War?

The decades-long conflict that is currently raging over short-termism and activist hedge funds strikes me as analogous to the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th Century, albeit fought with statistics (“empirical evidence”), op-eds and journal articles rather than cannon, pike and sword. I decided, after some thirty-six years in the front line of the army defending corporations and their boards, that pursuing the thought might result in an essay more interesting (and perhaps a bit more amusing) than my usual memos and articles.

In 1618, after two centuries of religious disputation and tenuous co-existence, the ascension of the staunchly partisan Ferdinand II as Holy Roman Emperor sparked a revolt that disrupted the balance of power in Europe and began the Thirty Years’ War. The War quickly involved the major powers of Europe. The conflict resulted in the Peace of Westphalia and the redrawing of the religious and political map of Europe, a new paradigm for the governance of Europe.

In 1985, a century of disputation as to the roles of professional management, boards of directors and shareholders of public companies similarly resulted in the disruption of the balance of power and general prosperity. In the two decades immediately preceding 1985, corporate raiders had perfected the front-end-loaded, two-tier, junk-bond-financed, bust-up tender offer, using tactics such as the “Highly Confident Letter” to launch a takeover without firm financing, “greenmail” (accumulating a block of stock and threatening a takeover bid unless the target company repurchases the block at a premium to the market) and litigation attacking protective state laws. Public companies did not have sufficient time or means to defend against corporate raiders. The battles culminated in two key 1985 decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court that restored the balance of power between boards of directors and opportunistic shareholders. In the Unocal case, the court upheld the power of the board of directors to reject, and take action to defeat, a hostile takeover bid, and in the Household case, it sustained the legality of the poison pill, which I had introduced three years earlier in an effort to level the playing field between corporate raiders and the companies they targeted.

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Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace?

The decades-long conflict that is currently raging over short-termism and activist hedge funds strikes me as analogous to the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th Century, albeit fought with statistics (“empirical evidence”), op-eds and journal articles rather than cannon, pike and sword. I decided, after some thirty-six years in the front line of the army defending corporations and their boards, that pursuing the thought might result in an essay more interesting (and perhaps a bit more amusing) than my usual memos and articles.

In 1618, after two centuries of religious disputation and tenuous co-existence, the ascension of the staunchly partisan Ferdinand II as Holy Roman Emperor sparked a revolt that disrupted the balance of power in Europe and began the Thirty Years’ War. The War quickly involved the major powers of Europe. The conflict resulted in the Peace of Westphalia and the redrawing of the religious and political map of Europe, a new paradigm for the governance of Europe.

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A New Paradigm for Corporate Governance

Recently, there have been three important studies by prominent economists and law professors, each of which points out serious flaws in the so-called empirical evidence being put forth to justify short-termism, attacks by activist hedge funds and shareholder-centric corporate governance. These new studies show that the so-called empirical evidence omit important control variables, use improper specifications, contain errors and methodological flaws, suffer from selection bias and lack real evidence of causality. In addition, these new studies show that the so-called empirical evidence ignore real-world practical experience and other significant empirical studies that reach contrary conclusions. These new studies are:

Emiliano Catan and Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Anti-Takeover Statutes, October 2014

Yvan Allaire and Francois Dauphin, The Game of ‘Activist’ Hedge Funds: Cui bono? August 31, 2015

John C. Coffee, Jr. and Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, September 4, 2015

For an earlier recognition of these defects in the so-called empirical evidence see, The Bebchuk Syllogism.

These new studies provide solid support for the recent recognition by major institutional investors that while an activist attack on a company might produce an increase in the market price of one portfolio investment, the defensive reaction of the other hundreds of companies in the portfolio, that have been advised to “manage like an activist,” has the potential of lower future profits and market prices for a large percentage of those companies and a net large decrease in the total value of the portfolio over the long term. Read More.

The Game Of ‘Activist’ Hedge Funds: Cui Bono?

This paper aims to describe the contemporary tactics and objectives of activist Hedge Funds as well as the actions taken by targeted companies as a result of their intervention. While doing so, we explored the consequences of activism over time when compared to a random sample of firms with similar characteristics at the time of intervention (effects on operational performance and share price returns), and we analyzed the singularities associated with salient sub-groups of targeted firms. The sample used for our analysis consists of all 259 firms targeted by activist hedge funds in 2010 and 2011. We found evidence that any improvements in operating performance (ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q) result mainly from selling assets, cutting capital expenditures, buying back shares, reduce workforce, and other basic financial manoeuvres. Although there is no evidence of deterioration over a three-year period, the stock’s performance of targeted companies over a three-year span barely matches the performance of a random sample of companies. We found that the best way for activists to make money for their funds is to get the company sold off or substantial assets spun-off. If not sold, the hedge fund episode often results for the targeted firms in change of senior management and board members, stagnation of assets and R&D. This research does not provide any evidence of the superior strategic sagacity of hedge fund managers but does point to their keen understanding of what moves stock prices in the short term.

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To Govern in the Interest of the Corporation

In Canadian business law, directors have a duty to act in the best interest of the corporation, which includes the duty to assess, fairly and equitably, the impact of the corporation’s actions and decisions on its stakeholders.

But which of the stakeholders’ expectations should be taken into account? How should a board arbitrate between the divergent expectations of different stakeholders? How should the interests of the shareholders be weighed in relation to the interests of the other stakeholders? Ultimately, in whose interests should the directors exercise their responsibility to govern the corporation’s affairs?

This text attempts to provide answers to these questions, which are deeply perplexing to many directors, by reviewing the relevant law in other jurisdictions, particularly Great Britain and the United States, and then parsing the relevant judgments of the Canadian courts. We also provide guidelines for a board’s decision process when several stakeholders may be impacted by a decision or action of the company.

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Capturing long-term investors the Toyota way

In the on-going quest for innovative capital structures, Toyota has recently provided an interesting twist and tied in knots a number of institutional investors. Toyota believes that developing the next generation technologies will require massive investments over many years. It also believes that the current state of investment practices, the prevalence of roaming funds and the general emphasis on short-term stock prices, all work against the required investor stability for such long-term undertaking.

As a result, we have determined that, in raising capital for research and development of next generation technologies, it is desirable to match to the extent possible the period in which investments in research and development contribute to our business performance with the period in which investments are made in us by investors. To that end, we have decided to issue the First Series Model AA Class Shares with voting rights and transfer restrictions that assume a medium to long term holding period”.

Reference document of the 111th ordinary general meeting, p.32

In a historical vote on June 16th 2015, Toyota shareholders adopted with a 75% majority the proposal to issue Model AA Class Shares. These shares will be sold only in Japan; they will not be listed, but will have voting rights. They will be priced at 120% of the ordinary shares and will be paid a dividend at a rate lower than ordinary shares but at an increasing rate every year. The company will commit to buy back the shares at the original price after five years. But at that time, holders of these shares will have the option of converting their shares into ordinary common shares at a conversion ratio yet to be determined.

Toyota will thus enlist the support for at least five years of patient shareholders, mostly Japanese retail investors, in order to pursue fundamental research into future technologies. It will raise an initial US$4 billion and is authorized to issue up to US$12billion of these shares for that purpose. If that endeavour is successful, all shareholders will benefit; of course, the impatient and the fickle may miss out but won’t be missed.

There seems to be no legal impediment for a Canadian company adopting this type of capital structure provided, alas, it gets the support of its actual shareholders.

Many “foreign” pension funds voiced their opposition to Toyota’s proposition. The influential CalSTRS (the pension fund of California teachers), Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, the Florida State Board of Administration, and somewhat surprisingly, Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) have all declared their intention to vote against the new Toyota shares.

As the CEO of the CPPIB has been doing an active and persuasive advocate of long-term investment agenda, one would have expected the CPPIB to support an innovative capital structure designed to draw in long-term investors and partly shield the company from the short-term pressures of financial markets. It appears however that the CPPIB still clings to the obsolete notion whereby two classes of shares are a capital sin that “can entrench management against shareholder pressure for change” (CPPIB proxy voting guidelines). Which shareholders and what change are questions best left unanswered.

In a rare instance, the two largest proxy advisory firms issued opposing recommendations to their clients. ISS recommended voting against the Toyota proposal while Glass Lewis came out in favour of it! ISS, it seems, worries that “a rise in the number of stable investors could lead to overly cozy relations between the company and its shareholders. This would make it difficult for the market to exercise adequate oversight of the company’s management”. So, stable investors are bad; the “market” is always right!

In a press release, CalSTRS Director of Corporate Governance argued that “[…] the new share class proposed by Toyota would be structured as debt instruments, with guaranteed and defined dividend payments. Yet, these shares would also have voting rights equal to those of common stock that don’t enjoy this equity risk exposure shield.” Fundamentally, CalSTRS is also sticking to the dogma about “one-share-one-vote”. One has to wonder if these funds, out of principle, have refused to buy shares of Berkshire Hathaway; Alibaba; Google; Facebook; Groupon; Expedia, UPS; Tyson; Ford, Nike, The NY Times; News Corp; CBS, Comcast, Blackstone; KKR; Apollo; Pershing Square Holdings, Third Point, etc.

All in all, the Toyota innovation should be closely examined by all who believe that currently dominant capital structures open the door wide to all types of stock market agitators and tourist investors. It is an empirical fact that these sorts of “shareholders” pressure management and boards of directors to deliver quick boosts in stock price, even if it means cutting down on R&D and capital expenditures.

Toyota is thinking “out of the box”. It is high time for institutional investors to clear their own thinking of shackles and cobwebs.

Opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the authors.

Activism, Short-Termism, and the SEC

Today, I’d like to pull together some themes that I have been thinking, speaking, and writing about during my tenure and address them more holistically. Specifically, I’d like to share with you some thoughts about shareholder activism, short-termism, and the SEC.

I. What is activism?

Like many others, I view activism broadly: it is simply the actions of investors who are dissatisfied with management’s decision-making and corporate strategy and who, rather than selling their shares, try to force those companies to change.[1] But why bother? Despite the best efforts of certain policymakers over the last six years, the U.S. capital markets are still the deepest and most liquid in the world, and for many investors, it is trivially easy to exit one’s investment by selling and walking away. But an index fund manager can’t just sell the shares of the companies in the index. A hedge fund manager may see more alpha in driving improvements at a single company than in stock-picking. And a socially-motivated investment fund manager or gadfly can get a platform for idiosyncratic goals.

Are these activists good or bad? Often this question is posed as Manichean: light vs dark, good vs evil. This binary view of the world, divided between those who are either pro- or anti-activism, is convenient, but it is also far too simplistic. We need to break down activism one degree further, and ask: is it aimed at creating long-term shareholder wealth, and does it actually do so?[2] Some activism is, and does; other activism is not, or does not.[3]

II. The SEC’s role regarding activism

So how does the SEC determine which is which? Simple: it doesn’t, and shouldn’t. The various states have been entrusted with determining the substantive rights of shareholders, while the SEC’s role traditionally has been to set the proper conditions for investors to be able to make an intelligent, informed determination for themselves — that is, to create a level playing field, chiefly through disclosure.[4] And traditionally, the SEC has been an expert groundskeeper. Unfortunately, that prudent division of responsibilities has been eroded, in some instances through our own actions or inaction in the face of changing markets, and other times through our own overzealous implementation of legislative enactments. As a result, as groundskeepers go, the SEC increasingly has more in common with Caddyshack’s Carl Spackler.[5] Maybe this is due to our relentless pursuit of the many gophers in the Dodd-Frank Act over the last five years! I would like to discuss a few specific areas to illustrate my point.

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The free advice of activist investors is worth plenty to shareholders

At 8:38 a.m. on June 11, the activist investment firm Elliott Management—run by billionaire Paul Singer—disclosed that it controlled a 7.1% interest in software vendor Citrix Systems, and wanted to meet with management to discuss its proposal to overhaul the company.

More than seven hours passed before Fort Lauderdale-based Citrix CTXS, +0.86% produced a noncommittal, one-paragraph, reply. By then the game already was on, with the stock trading up $4.42, or 7%.

About 165 activist hedge funds manage $120 billion, and produced astonishing 50% compounded returns from 2012 to 2014, according to the Alternative Investment Management Association. Singer’s Elliott Management, with $26 billion under management, is among the biggest—and most ambitious. As the firm pledged to shake up Citrix, it was also facing down Samsung Group in a South Korean court, over Samsung’s proposed, stage-managed merger of two affiliates.

In a public letter, senior portfolio manager Jesse Cohn told Citrix CEO Mark Templeton and the board of directors that Citrix could realize a share value of $90 to $100 by the end of 2016, up from the previous day’s closing price of $65.97. The path to prosperity was to slash operating costs, consolidate distribution channels and product portfolio, trim spending on “speculative R&D initiatives without clear route-to-market or tangible competitive advantage” and buy back up to 38% of its shares.

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The Lessons of DuPont: Corporate Governance For Dummies

“Among practitioners, it is a customary cliché to say that all proxy contests—just like all trials—are unique and idiosyncratic. There is some truth to that easy generalization, but it also misses the forest for the trees. Some obvious truths stand out in the recent battle between Trian Fund Management and DuPont that will apply to future contests:

1. What explains DuPont’s Victory? DuPont won only a narrow victory, despite enormous advantages. Press accounts have reported that DuPont won 52% of the vote. This close margin may seem surprising, given (1) DuPont’s very large market capitalization (over $68 billion), (2) DuPont’s very successful recent performance (it has beaten the return on the S&P 500 index for a number of years); and (3) DuPont’s large retail ownership (over 30%, which shareholders usually support management). Add to this the further fact that DuPont’s CEO (Ellen Kullman) ably portrayed herself an “agent of change,” responsive to shareholder concerns, rather that the defender of a Maginot Line. Early on, she agreed to spin off DuPont’s major chemical division (now called Chemours). Finally, Trian Fund did not own that much stock (only about 2.7%). All in all, this was the largest public company ever subjected to a proxy fight for board seats. Hence, the question lingers: given DuPont’s size, success, and flexibility, and the absence of any “wolf pack” with a sizeable stake, why was the margin of victory so close?

One answer has to be that the governance professionals at pension funds and mutual funds now favor (or at least are open to) the idea of a divided, factionalized board. Putting Nelson Petz on DuPont’s board struck many of them as a low-cost means, with little downside risk, of keeping DuPont “in play” and signaling the shareholders’ desire for more spinoffs and less investment in long-term capital projects, including research and development. Consistent with this attitude, two new studies this year show that activists have achieved over 75% success in recent proxy contests, electing at least one director.[1] Indeed, the odds are so stacked in favor of activist investors who run a “short slate” of director nominees that the number of proxy contests has recently fallen. Why? Managements would much rather negotiate with activists over the identities of their nominees (and the size of any stock buyback) than become involved in a hostile fight that they are likely to lose. The activists may obtain a little less in these negotiations than they would win in a proxy fight, but they correspondingly save the $10 million or so in expenses that the proxy contest would cost them. As a result, both sides would rather settle and increasingly do so. Even Martin Lipton, the staunchest of the critics of shareholder activism, has recognized in a recent memo to his clients that if you can’t beat them, you need to join them.[2] ”

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IGOPP mentionned in the Wall Street Journal, the MorningstarAdvisor and the Dow Jones Newswires

The Executive Chair of the Institute, Dr. Yvan Allaire,  is mentionned in the Wall Street Journal, the MorningstarAdvisor and the Dow Jones Newswires! In an article about the activist hedge funds.

“U.S. businesses, feeling heat from activist investors, are slashing long-term spending and returning billions of dollars to shareholders, a fundamental shift in the way they are deploying capital. Data show a broad array of companies have been plowing more cash into dividends and stock buybacks, while spending less on investments such as new factories and research and development. Activist investors have been pushing for such changes, but it isn’t just their target companies that are shifting gears. More businesses sitting on large piles of extra cash are deciding to satisfy investors by giving some of it back. Rock-bottom interest rates have made it cheap to borrow to buy back shares, which can boost a company’s stock price. And technology-driven productivity gains are enabling some businesses to do more with less.”

[…]

“If they aren’t, then we have to worry about the impact,” says Yvan Allaire, the executive chairman of the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations. “It has to be a fairly significant impact on the economy.” Read more

Dual-class of shares: with the proper framework, a benefit for all

A recent piece in the Financial Post (“Time for regulators to take major look at dual class shares”, Barry Critchley, May 14, 2015) reports on the cogitations of a law professor who proposes as an “optimal solution” to abolish existing dual class of shares and prohibit such capital structure at IPO time, no less!

Of course, that remarkable suggestion is based on the same lame arguments that were hashed, rehashed and refuted in countless articles. The buyers of these shares need protection as they are obviously ignorant, misinformed and when buying these IPO shares, “they are not necessarily turning their minds to the share structure

And this pronouncement comes as the Canadian IPO market is coming out of its slumber with a series of highly successful new issues with a dual class structure (BRP, Cara, Shopify, Stingray).

Entrepreneurs and institutional investors know a few salient facts:

  • Financial markets, and the stock market in particular, have changed greatly over the last twenty years; institutional investors and indexed funds represent a large percentage of all shares traded on stock markets (more than 70% in the USA, between 50% and 60% in Canada, although precise statistics are less available). These investors are usually quite savvy and know what they are buying.
  • Entrepreneurs will not come to the market if it means becoming vulnerable to a hostile takeover (remember that Canada has one of the most favorable legal context for hostile takeovers), or being harassed on a quarterly basis for every decision that does not bring an immediate increase in earnings per share, or being targeted by “activist” hedge funds pushing hard to auction off their company.
  • A dual class of shares is not a free lunch in Canada. Indeed, since 1987, the TSX requires that any company issuing a class of shares with multiple votes also adopt a «coattail» provision to ensure that all shareholders will be treated equally, should an offer be made to buy the shares of the controlling shareholder. This provision in itself eliminates the single most important source of inequality between classes of shareholders. Whenever a «coattail» provision is in place, there is no justification for paying a premium to the holders of multiple-voting shares, should these be converted into subordinate shares. As Magna had become public before 1987 (and thus grand-fathered), it was not subjected to the requirements of a «coattail», hence the astounding premium paid to the controlling shareholder. It is noteworthy that despite the surging popularity of dual class of shares in the USA, there is no equivalent «coattail» requirement for American companies.
  • Both the Institute that I chair (IGOPP, in 2006) and the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG, in 2013) have proposed similar frameworks to enhance the attractiveness of dual class of shares. In addition to a universal and rigorous «coattail» provision preferably enforced by the regulators (rather than by the TSX), that framework includes:
  • A reasonable multiple of votes so that absolute control is achieved only with a sizeable chunk of shareholder equity owned by the controlling shareholder(s).

Both CCGG and IGOPP felt that a multiple of four votes would be appropriate as it calls upon the controlling shareholder to own 20% of the shareholders’ equity to maintain absolute control (50% of the votes). The recent IPOs have not observed that recommendation although the ratios, except for Cara, have been generally kept reasonable and certainly in no case is there a repetition of the 100-to-1 ratio of the Magna days:

Graph 2015.05.27- article dual share

  • The class of shares with a single vote should elect up to a third of all board members. Controlling shareholders should exercise their power to elect directors only for the fraction of the board equivalent to their percentage of total voting rights, with a cap of two-thirds of board members elected by a controlling shareholder. Unfortunately that guideline was not observed by any of the recent IPOs.
  • A sunset provision. A delicate issue with multiple-voting shares revolves around the advisability of setting a termination time or event at which point the dual-class structure would be collapsed into a single-class structure with all shares having henceforth a single vote. All of the recent issues in Canada have elected to adopt a variation of a particular form of «sunset» clause: the dual structure would be eliminated in the event that the controlling shareholders and their successors hold shares which represent less than 50% of all votes or some equivalent formulation.

Thus, it is quite possible to get the very real benefits of the dual-class structure and protect adequately the «minority» shareholders. If regulators feel the hitch to intervene on this issue, it would behoove them to adopt, and enforce for future IPOs, a framework along the lines proposed by IGOPP and the CCGG.