All posts by mlamnini

Enhancing the Dynamics of Boards of Directors

Board members with extensive experience readily observe, and often comment, that the quality of governance and a board’s effectiveness result as much from subtle, dynamic, intangible factors as from strict observance of the fiduciary and formal aspects of governance.

These factors take shape in social interaction among members, in the style of the Chair’s leadership, in what happens before and after formal meetings and during discussions at board and committee meetings. That observation is pertinent for every type of organization, be it a listed corporation, a public institution, a State-owned corporation, a cooperative or a non-profit organization.

Thus, initiatives, mechanisms and processes to improve the dynamic interaction and interplay among board members should enhance a board’s effectiveness. Yet, this particular aspect of governance has been the subject of very few empirical studies because, for reasons of confidentiality, boards cannot readily give researchers direct, live, access to board meetings and ancillary board activities.

One notable exception is Richard Leblanc’s doctoral thesis. Due to the network of contacts of his thesis director and co-author, James Gillies, he was able to observe a certain number of boards in action. In 2005 they published Inside the Boardroom, a book which offers an interesting typology of the dominant behaviours of members during board meetings. Focused on what could be observed at formal board meetings, the work by Leblanc and Gillies provides some insight about but one particular facet of board dynamics.

No other empirical study has been conducted on the issue since then.

Our Institute undertook to shed some light on these subtle, dynamic, intangible factors and, possibly, offer suggestions to directors and board chairs on ways to enhance the quality of governance.

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Canadian Global Champions: Their nature and staying power

It is a common lamentation (and a media favourite) to bemoan the passing of large Canadian companies into the hands of foreign owners. Quebec society, for a host of reasons, has been and remains particularly sensitive and reactive to these occurrences.

Yet, no sovereign country can be indifferent to the fact that important economic decisions get to be made abroad and according to the financial imperatives of foreign owners. The situation is even more fraught with political fall-out when the prospective acquirer is pursuing a hostile takeover. Even in the United States, various mechanisms make it very difficult to carry out an unwanted takeover of a company.

This issue acquires more saliency when a foreign takeover targets a so-called «industrial champion». If several are taken over in a short period of time, it becomes a political issue. Back in 2007 after the takeovers in quick succession of Alcan, Falconbridge, Inco and others, the federal government, in response to public outcry, set up the Competition Review Panel. The Panel made several wise recommendations, none of which seems to have been implemented. The crisis, and the public’s attention to the issue, had waned and thus Canada remained wide open to takeovers, foreign or domestic.

Of course, this concern begs the question of what is an industrial «champion» and how many of them are Canadian. Actually, The Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity (ICP), an independent organization funded by the Government of Ontario, has compiled a list of companies that meet the following criteria:

  1. Public or private companies headquartered in Canada and listed in the Globe and Mail’s Report on Business Top 1000 or in the Financial Post 500 largest companies (by revenues);
  2. With revenues of over $1 billion;
  3. Ranked among the top five companies globally (by revenue) in a specific market segment.

The ICP carried out this analysis for the years 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. Based on the above three criteria, there were roughly 40 companies which qualified as «Global Leaders» in each of those years. But the make-up of that list changes radically over the years.

Staying power

First, let’s consider what happened by 2016 to the 40 companies identified as «champions» in 2003:

  • 11 of them were sold or merged, including Alcan, Domtar, Falconbridge, Inco, Masonite, Moore, Nova Chemicals, and so on;
  • 4 went bankrupt or were re-organized: Abitibi-Price, Nortel, Quebecor World, Tembec.

Of the 25 firms from the 2003 list still going strong in 2016, no less than 15 are controlled corporations, 10 of which through a dual class of shares. Only 10 of the 25 companies still qualifying as industrial leaders were widely held, one-share-one-vote, companies. In fact, two of these ten companies could not be taken over as they are protected by legal provision (Manulife) or their by-laws (CN).

So, of the 25 surviving industrial leaders of 2003, no less than 17 are protected from unwanted takeovers. Of the 15 companies that were dropped from the list of 2003, only one (Quebecor World) had a controlling shareholder.

New arrivals

The last year for which the ICP compiled this list of industrial leaders was 2011. Compared to their 2003 list, there were 18 new companies identified as global industrial leaders. Again, of these 18 companies, 7 were controlled corporations, 3 of which through a dual class of shares. There were an additional 4 companies which could not be taken over because of legal prohibitions of takeovers in their sector of activity (banks and insurance companies, airlines).

So, of 18 additions in 2011, there were 11 companies with a capital structure or a legal environment which supported a long-term management and strategy, relatively immune from the threats and short-term pressures of financial markets.

It is an important policy issue for Canada. How did some Canadian global leaders avoid being targeted by U.S. companies during the years when our currency created instant bargains by reducing considerably the cost to acquire a Canadian company? How did these surviving «Global Champions» curb short-termism and manage to stay as best in class of their respective market segments for over a decade?

Policy makers should heed the message contained in these eloquent data. Ownership and control of key corporations by residents of the country, a capitalism of owners if you want, have important social and economic ramifications. Headquarters are where the strategic decisions are made, decisions that often impact the broader society. Private ownership, dual class of shares or legal prohibitions on takeovers in strategic sectors ensure these decisions are made in Canada and for the benefits of Canadians.

Isabelle Courville becomes a board member of IGOPP

The Institute for Governance (IGOPP) is pleased to announe the appointment of Ms. Isabelle Courville as a new board member.

Ms. Courville, an engineer and a lawyer by training, is Chair of the Board of Directors of the Laurentian Bank of Canada. Previously, Ms. Courville was President of Hydro‐Québec Distribution. This division has 7,000 employees serving 4 million customers throughout Québec.

She was also President of Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie, the division in charge of operating Hydro-Québec’s power transmission system. Ms. Courville was active for 20 years in the Canadian telecommunications business. She served as President of Bell Canada’s Enterprise Group and as President and Chief Executive Officer of Bell Nordiq Group.

She is a board member of Canadian Pacific Railway and the TVA Group. She also sits on the board of the Montreal Heart Institute Foundation, the Institute of Corporate Directors. Moreover and of Veolia Environnement, a French multinational specialized in optimizing the utilization of resources. She was a member of the APEC (Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation) Business Advisory Council from 2010 to 2013.

In 2012, Isabelle Courville was selected amongst Fortune Magazine’s 50 Most Powerful Women in Business. She is a three‐time recipient of Canada’s Most Powerful Women: Top 100 Awards, granted by the Women’s Executive Network. In 2007, she received the McGill Management Achievement Award for her contribution to the business world and community involvement. In 2010, the Ordre des ingénieurs du Québec awarded her the Prix Hommage for her exceptional contribution to the engineering profession.

 

The case for dual class of shares

With the Bombardier saga and the Couche-Tard warning bell, the usual litany of arguments against dual class of shares was again dusted off. Commentators opposed to this capital structure seem to forget or overlook the inconvenient truth that many of Canada’s industrial champions are controlled corporations often through a dual class of shares.

That is the conclusion one may draw from the Ontario Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity study which identified 77 Canadian industrial champions; only 23 of them were widely-held corporations; 33 were listed controlled corporations, 19 of them via a dual class of shares; another 16 were privately held! (Flourishing in the global competitiveness game, working paper 11, September 2008). Furthermore, 23 of the 50 largest employers in Canada were dual class companies (Canada’s 50 biggest employers in 2012, Globe and Mail, June 28th 2012)

That is a fundamental point:

Without a controlling shareholder, without a dual class of shares, there would be no aeronautical industry in Canada, no C-Series to compete with Boeing and Airbus, a singular Canadian feat, no Magna in Ontario (a dual class company until 2010), no Rogers Communication, no Teck Resources, no Canadian Tire, no Weston, no CGI, no Shaw and so on.

And why is that?

In a period such as the 2002-2003 when the U.S. dollar was worth close to C$1.60 and the stock market was seriously depressed, all these Canadian companies would have been bargains for U.S. acquirers. Canada would have reverted to the branch-plant economy of the 1950s.

In any case, at one point or another, their success would have attracted foreign buyers. May we mention Tim Horton, Alcan, Falconbridge, etc. That is the reason why so many sensitive industrial sectors are legally protected in Canada from foreign takeovers (banks, telecoms, airlines, media companies)

And wisely so! For the Canadian regulatory context is one of the most hospitable to unwanted takeovers, much more so than in the United States. And don’t count on the toothless Investment Canada to block foreign acquisitions.

American companies have multiple measures (although waning in effectiveness) at their disposal to rebuff an unwanted takeover of their company (staggered boards, poison pills of unlimited duration, board’s authority to just say no, etc.) So, because of these American conditions, Boeing may carry on with its long-term investments without fear of an unwanted takeover in difficult times, and they have had quite a few.

Then, financial markets have become populated by short-term so-called investors and analysts fixated on the next quarter’s earnings per share and stock performance; they have become the locus of nasty financial games played with and around publicly listed companies.

Thus, the new breed of American (and Canadian) entrepreneurs not only do they want to be shielded from unwanted takeovers they also seek to insulate themselves from the quarterly pressures of analysts and short-term investors.

In 2015, according to Prosoaker Research (2016), 24% of all new share offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. were made with a dual class structure, a sharp increase from 15% in 2014 and 18% en 2013. So, young companies such as Alphabet (i.e. Google), Facebook, Groupon, Expedia, (and, in Canada, Cara, BRP, Shopify, Spin Master, Stingray) have issued two classes of shares, one with multiple votes which assures them of an unassailable control over their companies and makes them relatively indifferent to the short-term gyrations of earnings and stock price.

Furthermore, in Canada since 1987 (but not in the USA), companies issuing a class of shares with multiple votes must adopt, as a requirement to be listed on the Toronto stock exchange, a coat-tail provision. That provision essentially ensures that all shareholders will receive the same price for their shares, should the controlling shareholders decide to sell out. That twist, by itself, has removed most of the potential financial benefits of control through a dual class of shares.

Add to the mix of dual class companies the much stricter contemporary rules of corporate governance and the presence of a majority of independent directors on their boards and you have a recipe for success, for long-term strategic thinking, and for bold job-creating investments. It turns out to be a demonstrably optimal arrangement for all investors: controlling shareholders with their wealth at stakes managing, or supervising management, and taking a long-term view of the company.

Financial performance

If getting good steady returns is what investors are looking for, dual class companies are indeed a good bet. The evidence is now pretty compelling that these companies perform better than conventional companies; or at least, perform as well and provide the added benefit of keeping their ownership and headquarters in the home country.

The following table provides some of that evidence from recent studies (but with different time periods):

Performance of Canadian dual class firms, compared to single class firms (or reference index) over 5, 10 and 15 years periods

Table - dual class

Conclusion

Setting aside cases of extraordinarily attractive companies, such as Amazon where Bezos still owns 18% of the shares, it is difficult for companies to undertake gutsy investments and implement strategies unfolding over many years without some buffer from the short-term pressures of contemporary financial markets. That may not be to the liking of some financial players but so be it.

That pressing reality must be acknowledged by all, including policy makers, who do not have a vested interest in making lots of money quickly. Don’t be fooled by specious arguments merely disguising self-interest. Investors who would have bought a basket of shares in Canadian dual-class companies would have done well over the last ten years better than by holding shares in a portfolio of single-class companies.

Do not be swayed by the spurious argument of shareholder democracy. If shareholders were the equivalent of citizens in a democracy, then tourists (i.e. transient shareholders) would not vote and all new shareholders (i.e. immigrants) would have to wait for a considerable period of time before acquiring the right to vote.

Dual-class companies account for a good number of Canada’s industrial champions; indeed dual class shares are a pillar of our industrial structure. That ownership structure should be encouraged, promoted and blessed, provided proper safeguards are in place to protect minority shareholders.

Opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author.

Activist hedge funds come to Japan

From Japan Today comes an interesting column by Yvan Allaire and Francois Dauphin:

Now foreign investors, holding over 30% of their shares, are unrelenting in their pressure for Japanese companies to adopt American-style governance. New governance codes have been written and Japanese stock exchanges are pushing for their implementation. Foreign money managers and institutional investors stand to benefit from changes in the ethos of Japanese companies which would make them more like American companies in their devotion to shareholder value creation.

That may be the inevitable outcome of a globalized financial market but Japanese promoters of this new governance orthodoxy did not quite understand that “good” governance provides the lever, the entry point for activist hedge funds and their cohort of supporters. These funds thrive, and can implement their standard recipes, only where publicly listed companies have no controlling shareholders and when they can robe themselves with the mantle of defenders of “good” governance.”

And they are now coming to Japan in droves. …

(…)

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Two flawed studies about controlled corporations by ISS and IRRCI

The performance of controlled companies has been a contentious issue. For different reasons, various parties have worked hard at convincing the investor class that capital structures other than one-share, one-vote would produce inferior results for shareholders. Consequently, most investment funds frown upon such structures, at best tolerate them, and, at worst, have adopted policies of non-investment in these companies.

The Investor Responsibility Research (IRRC) Institute and ISS, the proxy management firm, have been most strident in their opposition to “controlled” corporations and have produced studies supposedly buttressing their position.

Thus, in October 2012, they published a study purporting to assess the relative performance of controlled and non-controlled companies listed on exchanges in the United States (the S&P 1500 Composite Index).

The study received little notice in the media but circulated widely in the financial community as it claimed that the “findings” demonstrated the inferior performance of “controlled” corporations.

The statistical findings of this so-called research are summarized in the following table (page 8 of their report).

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Japan discovers “good” corporate governance, American style

Not so long ago in an age when they were eating the lunch of American corporations, the Toyotas, Hitachis, Sonys, Canon, Hondas were governed in the worst possible way, at least according to the canons of American governance.

Their boards were made up almost exclusively of corporate insiders, with no independent directors, no diversity, no obeisance whatsoever to the diktats of governance gurus and enforcers, no responsiveness to investment funds and financial markets. Of course these were also the days when corporate control resided in keiretsus (or network of interconnected firms and banks). Only 5% of the Japanese companies’ shares were owned by foreign investors in 1990. But “the times they are a changing”.

Now foreign investors, holding over 30% of their shares, are unrelenting in their pressure for Japanese companies to adopt American-style governance. New governance codes have been written and Japanese stock exchanges are pushing for their implementation.

Foreign money managers and institutional investors stand to benefit from changes in the ethos of Japanese companies which would make them more like American companies in their devotion to shareholder value creation.

That may be the inevitable outcome of a globalized financial market but Japanese promoters of this new governance orthodoxy did not quite understand that “good” governance provides the lever, the entry point for activist hedge funds and their cohort of supporters. These funds thrive, and can implement their standard recipes, only where publicly listed companies have no controlling shareholders and when they can robe themselves with the mantle of defenders of “good” governance.

And they are now coming to Japan in droves.

On April 7th 2016, having lost a board fight to Daniel Loeb (head of Third Point LLC., an activist hedge fund known for its aggressive tactics) Toshifumi Suzuki, founder, chairman and chief executive of Seven & i Holdings Co. (owner of the Seven-Eleven chain) resigned his position. The result represents a victory for shareholder activists who have targeted Japanese companies on the back of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s corporate governance campaign for businesses to increase shareholder returns. (FT.com, April 7th 2016).

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“Good” Governance and Stock Market Performance

Did the quest, one might dare say the obsession, with implementing “good” governance in public corporations result in better stock market performances for those companies that have adopted the best governance practices?

Numerous studies, mostly American, have tried to show a convincing relationship between governance and performance, usually with disappointing results.

Indeed, it is not surprising that such an undertaking was doomed to fail. The economic and stock market performance of a company over the years is the joint product of macro-economic, cyclical, competitive, industrial and strategic factors; it reflects as well the residual influence of good or bad decisions made over the years. In spite of all the sophisticated statistical tools marshalled to try to isolate and capture the ineffable and fleeting effect of “good” governance (assuming of course that such an effect is indeed
at work), these undertakings have generally been unsuccessful.

And yet, for 14 years, the Globe and Mail’s Report on Business (ROB) has computed and published a governance score for each of the some 230 largest companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The annual publication of the scores as well as the ranks assigned to every corporation has become a business ritual attended to by corporate leaders and the governance industry.

This overall score, with 100 as a maximum, is the sum of scores on four dimensions of governance:

1.  Board composition (32 points out of 100)

2. Shareholding and compensation (29/100)

3. Shareholder rights (28/100)

4. Disclosure (11/100)

Each of these aspects of governance is defined and captured through a series of variables (37 in total in 2015), each one given a number of points. Generally, these variables do touch upon all the desiderata of impeccable fiduciary governance. Over the years, the scoring system has adapted and evolved in sync with the changing and ever increasing requirements of “good” governance.

Be this as it may, we felt it would be interesting to survey, once more, how the ROB governance scores were related to the stock market performance of the largest Canadian corporations.

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Quebec nationalists enraged by $3.2B sale of Rona ‘jewel’ to U.S.-based Lowe’s

MONTREAL — News coverage of Rona Inc. in recent years has described the Quebec-based hardware chain as “embattled,” “under-performing,” “struggling” and “slumping.”

[…]

Yvan Allaire, president of the Montreal-based Institute for Governance, considers himself a nationalist when it comes to protecting key industries. For example he opposed Rio Tinto’s 2007 takeover of Alcan, which saw the head office leave Montreal along with decision-making over which smelters would remain in operation.

“Alcan was the kind of company you could really get upset about, a huge company with a huge headquarters,” Allaire said. “Here we’re talking about a retail establishment being replaced by another retail establishment, but the name will be kept and so on.”

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Hedge Fund Activism: A Guide for the Perplexed

The message of the Dow/DuPont merger and split up is simple: No firm is today “too big to target.” Activists can see the transaction as evidence that, even in the rare case where they lose a proxy fight (as they did at DuPont last year in a squeaker), the handwriting is still on the wall, and their game plan, if appealing, will ultimately prevail. Even though Trian could not win a majority vote to seat its candidates on the DuPont board, it held onto its stake, and the DuPont board quickly ditched their CEO in the wake of that fight and then approved the offer from Dow. Dow also was under pressure (from Third Point, an even more aggressive and short-tempered activist fund). The result was a marriage made somewhere other than in heaven.

Nor does this case stand alone. Lion Point Capital has now engaged Ally Financial (the former GMAC, which did fail in the wake of the 2008 crash), notwithstanding that Ally has been classified as a “systemically important financial institution” (or “SIFI”) by the FSOC. As soon as it became clear that even a SIFI could be stalked, AIG’s stock price began to soar, as market watchers predicted that it also would be targeted by activists seeking to downsize it. Lastly, MetLife downsized itself, beating activists to the punch in its effort to avoid being also classified as a SIFI […]

Some data about the impact of hedge fund activism is clear: namely, its impact on research and development (“R&D”).  One study by Allaire and Dauphin used the FactSet database to track the impact of a hedge fund “engagement” on R&D expenditures and found that over the four-year period following a hedge fund engagement, R&D expenditures at “surviving” target firms declined by more than 50% (expressed as a percentage of sales).  This statistic likely understates the full impact, as not all target firms “survive” (i.e., they are acquired in a merger or they are broken-up in a restructuring), and in these cases the decline in R&D expenditures (although not measurable from financial reports) is almost certainly greater.  This study did use a control, and in the control group R&D expenditures actually rose (modestly) over the same period, thus suggesting that causation is clear.

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Who should pick corporate directors?

“Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin cogently analyze the costs and risks of proxy access, arguing that “Anyone believing that this process is likely to produce stronger boards in the long run needs to consider anew the calculus of current and prospective board members, the actions, likely dysfunctional, of people facing the humiliation (and economic loss) of an electoral rejection.”

Is 2015, Like 1985, an Inflection Year?

In an October 2015 post, I posed the question: Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace to the Thirty Years’ War? As we approach the end of 2015, I thought it would be useful to note some of the most cogent recent developments on which the need, and hope, for a new paradigm is based. These developments include, among other things, the accumulation of a critical mass of academic research that discredits the notion that short-termism, activist attacks and shareholder-centric corporate governance tend to create rather than destroy long-term value.

In January a Report of the Commission on Inclusive Prosperity, co-chaired by Lawrence Summers and Ed Balls, identified activism and short-termism as being a threat to the American economy and society. The report noted that reforming corporate governance and moving away from quarterly reporting are critical

[…]

During 2015, five important papers were published by prominent economists, law professors, a renowned jurist and The Conference Board, each of which points out serious flaws in the so-called empirical evidence and policy arguments being put forth to justify short-termism, attacks by activist hedge funds and shareholder-centric corporate governance.

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Who Should Pick Board Members?

There is a frenzied rush for shareholders to get a new ‘right”, the right to put up their own nominees for board membership. Boards of directors, so goes a dominant opinion, are not to be fully trusted to pick the right kind of people as directors or to shift the membership swiftly as circumstances change.

In 2014/2015, proposals from institutional investors (or even from management) to give shareholders access to the board nomination process have proliferated. No less than 74 U.S. corporations[1] have now inserted (or soon will) in their by-laws the “right” of shareholders to nominate members of the board, among which GE, Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Chevron, Citigroup, Verizon, and so on. And a tsunami of similar proposals is visible over the horizon.

Of course, this agitation started In August 2010 when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced Rule 14a-11 giving shareholders having owned at least 3% of a public corporation’s shares for at least 3 years, the right to propose nominees to the board (for up to a maximum of 25% of the members of the existing board).

This new regulation was immediately challenged in the courts and had to be withdrawn when it was struck down. However, an amendment to Rule 14a-8 (amendment made by the SEC to accommodate its proposed regulation on proxy access) remained in force; its purpose was to allow shareholders to submit proposals on proxy access rules, which, if adopted by a majority of shareholders, were to be made part of the corporation’s by-laws.

This access to voting proxies is fast becoming a part of the governance landscape in the United States; the only issues that are still debated are qualifying ones: the level of shareholding, the holding period, the maximum number of shareholders which may band together to achieve the admission criteria and various aspects of its implementation.

It is very unlikely that major corporations will try to oppose the movement as many institutional investors are fiercely supportive of this measure. However, the eventual impact of this initiative on corporate governance raises important issues that seem totally absent from the discussions around this new “right” of shareholders.

Proxy access may have adverse effect on internal board dynamics

Among the arguments supposedly supportive of shareholder access to the nominating process, one is particularly noxious: the notion that “fear” among board members of being singled out for replacement would lead them to raise their game.

The consequences for an individual director being voted out of a board would be very significant and painful, both in economic and reputational terms; this is true for both incumbent nominees and the new nominees proposed by the shareholders.

Faced with the risk and arbitrary nature of a contested election, the directors would try to promote their personal contributions with institutional investors (and proxy advisors), thus generating an unhealthy competition among colleagues. In any event, how would the thousands of shareholders, called upon to choose between several nominees, decide for which nominee to vote, which nominee to dismiss when the voting proxy contains more nominees than available seats?

Smaller institutional funds may well come to rely on proxy advisors (such as ISS or Glass Lewis), again increasing by tenfold the influence of these outfits on the governance of public corporations. These proxy advisors will propose, as per their usual practice, some obvious, measurable criteria to make this choice: age of the directors, number of years as a member of the board, which are, in fact, arbitrary criteria, uncorrelated with actual performance.

Once these criteria are well understood, it is likely that corporations will try to preventively replace directors to avoid conflicts with large shareholders and to make rooms for their nominees. Therefore, directors would be shown the way out because they no longer satisfy the arbitrary criteria selected by proxy voting advisors without taking into account their actual contribution.

Even more likely, boards of directors will initiate discussions and negotiations with institutional investors who have indicated their intention to propose their own nominees in an effort to reach common ground. These secret negotiations are likely to result in some of the nominees proposed by institutional investors becoming the nominees of management and some current directors presumably viewed, more or less deservedly, as being weaker (older, longer tenure) forcibly retired.

Anyone believing that this process is likely to produce stronger boards in the long run needs to consider anew the calculus of current and prospective board members, the actions, likely dysfunctional, of people facing the humiliation (and economic loss) of an electoral rejection.

Shareholder access to the director nomination process brings forth a host of other issues related to the logistics of its application and the potential adverse effects on board dynamics including:

  • the usurpation of a responsibility historically and legally devolved exclusively on the board;
  • the implicit, yet false, postulate whereby directors are only accountable to the shareholders and are only responsible for the interests of shareholders;
  • the reputational issues of the directors submitted to a contested election and the self‑protective behaviour this would bring about;
  • the actual risk of secret negotiations being held between management and investors who are intending to propose nominees;
  • the overwhelming influence accruing to proxy voting advisory firms, whose clients would expect their voting recommendations on the nominees;
  • the risk that the independence of directors nominated by shareholders would be compromised or so perceived;
  • the risk of creating factions and a poisonous atmosphere within the board, which would compromise the proper functioning of the board;
  • the risk of ending up with a board deficient in relevant experience or competence;
  • the risk that the process be hijacked by single-issue groups of shareholders.

These unfortunate outcomes of granting shareholders the right to propose their nominees for the board should merit careful consideration before jumping on the bandwagon.

[1] Data from SharkRepellent.net, as of September 8th, 2015.

This post comes to us from Yvan Allaire, Ph.D. (MIT) and Executive Chair of the Institute for governance of private and public organizations (IGOPP), and François Dauphin, Chartered Professional Accountant (CPA, CMA), MBA and Director of Research of IGOPP. The post is based on the authors’ Institution Policy Paper, entitled “Who should pick board members? Proxy Access by Shareholders to the Director Nomination Process” and is available here.

The game of “activist” hedge funds: Cui bono?

This article aims to describe the contemporary objectives and tactics of activist hedge funds as well as the actions taken by the targeted companies as a result of their intervention. In this research, we explore the consequences of activism over time (impact on operational performance and share price returns) and compare these with a random sample of firms with similar characteristics at the time of intervention; we also analyse the singularities associated with salient sub-groups of targeted firms. The sample used for our research consists of all 259 firms targeted by activist hedge funds in 2010 and 2011. We found evidence that any improvements in operating performance (return on assets, return on equity, Tobin’s Q) result mainly from selling assets, cutting capital expenditures, buying back shares, reduce workforce and other basic financialmanoeuvres. Although there is no evidence of deterioration over a 3-year period, the stock’s performance of targeted companies over a 3-year span barely matches the performance of a random sample of companies.

We found that the best way for activists tomakemoney for their funds is to get the company sold off or substantial assets spun off. If not sold, the hedge fund episode often results for the targeted firms in change of senior management and board members, stagnation of assets and R&D. This research does not provide any evidence of the superior strategic sagacity of hedge fund managers, but does point to their keen understanding of what moves stock prices in the short term. Read more

The game of ‘activist’ hedge funds: Cui bono?

This article aims to describe the contemporary objectives and tactics of activist hedge funds as well as the actions taken by the targeted companies as a result of their intervention. In this research, we explore the consequences of activism over time (impact on operational performance and share price returns) and compare these with a random sample of firms with similar characteristics at the time of intervention; we also analyse the singularities associated with salient sub-groups of targeted firms. The sample used for our research consists of all 259 firms targeted by activist hedge funds in 2010 and 2011. We found evidence that any improvements in operating performance (return on assets, return on equity, Tobin’s Q) result mainly from selling assets, cutting capital expenditures, buying back shares, reduce workforce and other basic financialmanoeuvres. Although there is no evidence of deterioration over a 3-year period, the stock’s performance of targeted companies over a 3-year span barely matches the performance of a random sample of companies.

We found that the best way for activists tomakemoney for their funds is to get the company sold off or substantial assets spun off. If not sold, the hedge fund episode often results for the targeted firms in change of senior management and board members, stagnation of assets and R&D. This research does not provide any evidence of the superior strategic sagacity of hedge fund managers, but does point to their keen understanding of what moves stock prices in the short term.

IGOPP’s Policy Paper on Proxy Access by Shareholders to the Director Nomination Process

The board of the Institute for Governance (IGOPP) unanimously approved a Policy paper on Proxy Access by Shareholders to the Director Nomination Process.

The prerogative to nominate the members of the board, which has historically been the sole responsibility of boards of directors, has now been challenged by institutional funds determined to acquire the right, under certain conditions, to nominate their own candidates.

A Working group made up of the IGOPP board members, chaired by Dr. Yvan Allaire, has examined all arguments in support and against the Proxy Access and concluded that shareholder proxy access is ill advised and may have a negative impact on governance practices. Therefore, IGOPP is opposed to the process whereby shareholders may nominate director candidates.

Shareholder access to the director nomination process brings forth a host of issues related to board dynamics and governance, for instance:

  • the reputational issues of the directors submitted to a contested election and the self-protective behaviour this would bring about;
  • the actual risk of secret negotiations being held between management an investors who are intending to propose nominees;
  • the overwhelming influence accruing to proxy voting advisory firms, whose clients would expect their voting recommendations on the nominees;
  • the risk that the independence of directors nominated by shareholders would be compromised or so perceived;
  • the risk of creating factions and a poisonous atmosphere within the board, which would compromise the proper functioning of the board;
  • the risk of ending up with a board deficient in relevant experience or competence.

However, IGOPP recommends that the nomination/governance committee of the board implement a robust consultation process with the corporation’s significant shareholders and report in the annual Management Information Circular on the process and criteria adopted for nominating any new director. The committee should also report on how the company is complying with the guidelines of the Canadian Securities Administrators’ Policy Statement 58-201.

Members of IGOPP’s board who have participated on the working group:

Yvan Allaire, PhD (MIT), FRSC
Executive Chair, IGOPP
Chair of the Working group

Andrew Molson
Chair
RES PUBLICA Consulting Group

Robert Parizeau
Chairman
Fonds de solidarité FTQ

Guylaine Saucier
Corporate Director

François Dauphin, MBA, CPA, CMA
Working group Secretary
Director of Research, IGOPP