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	<title>IGOPPShareholders &#8211; IGOPP</title>
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		<title>« Gildan to hold shareholder meetings in late spring for board of directors vote »</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/gildan-to-hold-shareholder-meetings-in-late-spring-for-board-of-directors-vote/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/gildan-to-hold-shareholder-meetings-in-late-spring-for-board-of-directors-vote/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jan 2024 14:56:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IGOPP Site web]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Shareholders]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/gildan-to-hold-shareholder-meetings-in-late-spring-for-board-of-directors-vote/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[« Canadian clothing maker Gildan Activewear Inc., GIL-T locked in a fight with dissident investors over its decision to sack its chief executive officer in December, is convening its shareholders in late spring to vote on whether they want a new board. The company says the timeline for the meeting on May 28 will give investors “a [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[« Canadian clothing maker Gildan Activewear Inc., GIL-T [1] locked in a fight with dissident investors over its decision to sack its chief executive officer in December, is convening its shareholders in late spring to vote on whether they want a new board.
The company says the timeline for the meeting on May 28 will give investors “a reasonable period” to evaluate the dissidents’ plan for the company while providing more opportunity to judge the competence of the new CEO brought in by the board, Vince Tyra. U.S. investment fund Browning West, which is leading the dissidents, called it an “attempt to buy time for a seemingly unqualified chief executive officer with a record of value destruction.”
Montreal-based Gildan is under pressure from Browning West and other shareholders to hold a meeting as soon as possible to consider bringing in a new board that would back the return of former CEO [2] Glenn Chamandy. Gildan says Mr. Chamandy sought to entrench himself as CEO and that giving him his job back would jeopardize the company’s future because he’s no longer up to the task.
Browning wants a majority of Gildan’s current 11-director board out. Earlier this month, it made a formal request to the company for a special meeting so investors can vote on the investment fund’s own slate of candidates, which is supported by five institutional shareholders.
Gildan responded Monday and says it has called two shareholders meetings for May 28, one a special meeting and the other an annual meeting. But the clothing maker says it will seek a court ruling on whether the Browning West requisition is legal. If a judge rules in Gildan’s favour, the company would hold just an annual meeting that day and drop the special meeting. Browning could still try to get its directors elected at the AGM.
“Over the last few weeks, the company has heard from numerous shareholders, both those who have indicated preliminary support for Browning West and those who have not,” Gildan said in a news release. “The board and shareholders are aligned in the view that a speedy resolution of this unnecessary proxy contest is in the best interests of the company and its shareholder owners.”
The timing of the May meeting isn’t sitting well with at least two shareholders, who could mount a legal challenge to it.
Browning West blasted the board for setting a date that will come nearly five months after it submitted its special meeting requisition. “It appears the board has learned nothing from its recent string of ill-conceived decisions and publicity stunts, which seem to have only succeeded in alienating shareholders,” the firm’s founders said in a statement.
Toronto-based Turtle Creek Asset Management echoed that view. “The board’s tactics are just another slap in the face of Gildan’s long-term shareholders,” the firm said in an e-mailed statement.
Gildan has held its last eight annual general meetings at the end of April or in the first week of May, meaning this year’s May 28 AGM would come later than normal.
“We do have a sense of urgency here on the activist side,” said François Dauphin, chief executive of Montreal’s Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations. “Every hour, every week that goes by makes the possibility of getting Mr. Chamandy back at the helm that much harder.”
Gildan said it “remains ready and willing” to engage with Browning West and other shareholders to find a resolution to the dispute. It said while it has offered the investment fund an opportunity to meet with the new CEO, it has not been offered access in turn to Browning’s director nominees.
The decision to hold the shareholders meeting in May takes into account statements by investors expressing support for a spring meeting and a desire to limit disruption to the business, Gildan said. Combining a special meeting with an AGM on the same day avoids having two meetings within a month or two of each other that would address similar issues, Gildan said.
On the question of whether the Browning West meeting requisition is legitimate, Gildan wants a court to decide. The company said it would file an application for declaratory judgment to the Quebec Court on Monday seeking a ruling that the Browning West requisition is null and void. »
Lire la suite [3]

[1] https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/stocks/GIL-T/
[2] https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-gildan-ceo-shareholders-stock/
[3] https://igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Gildan-to-hold-shareholder-meetings-in-late-spring-for-board-of-directors-vote-The-Globe-and-Mail_January-2024.pdf]]></content>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>« Le pire cas » pour les sociétés à double catégorie d’actions</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/le-pire-cas-pour-les-societes-a-double-categorie-dactions/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/le-pire-cas-pour-les-societes-a-double-categorie-dactions/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Nov 2021 16:37:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IGOPP Site web]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[L’IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Actionnaires]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Actions multivotantes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholders]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/rogers-is-worst-case-scenario-for-otherwise-profitable-dual-class-share-structures/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Le récent conflit au sein du conseil d’administration de Rogers Communications a mis en évidence le risque de gouvernance associé aux sociétés à double catégorie d’actions, mais des experts affirment que les entreprises dotées de cette structure peuvent être difficiles à éviter pour les investisseurs, car elles génèrent d’importants bénéfices. Les sociétés ayant des structures [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Le récent conflit au sein du conseil d’administration de Rogers Communications a mis en évidence le risque de gouvernance associé aux sociétés à double catégorie d’actions, mais des experts affirment que les entreprises dotées de cette structure peuvent être difficiles à éviter pour les investisseurs, car elles génèrent d’importants bénéfices.
Les sociétés ayant des structures à double catégorie d’actions émettent différents ensembles d’actions ordinaires qui proposent différents droits de vote et de contrôle. Souvent, un groupe d’actionnaires obtient une part démesurée de ces droits. Il s’agit généralement des fondateurs, des membres de la famille ou des dirigeants de l’entreprise.
Ce genre de structure est utilisé par des entreprises aussi diverses que la société mère de Google, Alphabet et Ford Motor Company. Au Canada, la liste comprend Shopify, Canada Goose Holdings, Bombardier et Alimentation Couche-Tard.
Selon des experts en investissement, la structure peut être problématique lorsqu’une catégorie d’actionnaires veut amener l’entreprise dans une direction contestée, comme Edward Rogers l’a fait avec l’entreprise de son défunt père.


Parce qu’Edward Rogers contrôlait 97,5 % des actions de classe A du géant des télécommunications, il a pu remplacer cinq membres du conseil d’administration malgré les objections d’autres administrateurs, dont sa mère et ses sœurs.
La Cour suprême de la Colombie-Britannique a confirmé vendredi le droit d’Edward Rogers d’apporter les modifications puisqu’il détenait le contrôle des votes.
« Le pire cas (pour les doubles catégories d’actions) est ce que nous voyons actuellement chez Rogers », a souligné François Dauphin, directeur général de l’Institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP), à Montréal.
Mais même ces scénarios ne font pas souvent hésiter les investisseurs à placer de l’argent dans des sociétés à double catégorie d’actions, puisque ce genre de structure est répandu, en particulier chez les sociétés les plus rentables, a-t-il souligné.
Des valeurs en forte croissance
Le Groupe TMX compte 90 sociétés à la Bourse de Toronto avec des structures à double catégorie. Les entreprises de la Bourse de Toronto qui ont recours à cet arrangement sont actives dans divers secteurs, des services financiers aux détaillants, en passant par les produits industriels, l’exploitation minière, l’immobilier et la technologie.
Douze des 90 sociétés se sont inscrites à la cote du parquet torontois en 2021, contre six en 2020 et trois en 2019.
M. Dauphin a souligné que de nombreux noms de cette liste – Shopify, Stingray, Lightspeed Commerce et Nuvei – ont bien performé sur le marché boursier ces dernières années, ce qui les rend difficiles à ignorer, même pour les investisseurs préoccupés par structures à double catégorie d’actions.
Par exemple, la valeur de l’action de Shopify, qui était d’environ 50 $ il y a cinq ans, atteint maintenant près de 2000 $.
« Quelqu’un n’investissant pas dans de nouvelles structures de double catégorie d’actions aurait manqué beaucoup de très bonnes et belles nouvelles sociétés, qui ont un potentiel de croissance qu’aucune autre société n’a actuellement », a observé M. Dauphin.
Alors que M. Dauphin comprend pourquoi les gens peuvent s’inquiéter des doubles catégories d’actions, il pense qu’elles représentent souvent de bons investissements en raison de l’influence qu’elles ont sur les entrepreneurs.
« Elles peuvent vraiment avoir un horizon à plus long terme […] ce qui est extrêmement intéressant pour les entreprises de nouvelles technologies qui ont besoin de ce temps pour faire mûrir leurs nouvelles idées », a-t-il souligné.
Il apprécie également cette structure parce qu’elle offre généralement une certaine immunité aux prises de contrôle hostiles, puisque la catégorie et le nombre d’actions plus élevés détenus par les membres de la famille ou les fondateurs suffisent souvent pour contrecarrer une acquisition ou une fusion, même si elle est soutenue par une autre catégorie d’actionnaires.
Cependant, aux yeux d’Alexander Dyck, professeur de finance, d’analyse économique et de politique à l’Université de Toronto, cette protection contre les prises de contrôle hostiles est l’élément problématique de cette structure.
« Une fois que le fondateur n’est plus en charge, il pourrait être très utile d’avoir quelqu’un d’autre qui vienne et qui surveille et si la direction n’est pas à la hauteur, pour la remplacer ou de prendre le relais d’une autre manière », a-t-il expliqué.
M. Dyck constate que plus une entreprise a une structure à deux catégories, plus elle est susceptible de rencontrer des problèmes, en particulier lorsqu’une entreprise change de mains pour aller à nouvelle génération de la famille – dont le sens des affaires peut être parfois moins aiguisé.
Malgré les difficultés et sa conviction quant à la nécessité d’avoir une surveillance pour la gouvernance d’entreprise, M. Dyck convient que de nombreuses sociétés à double catégorie d’actions ont obtenu des rendements considérables.
« C’est un risque, mais lorsque vous essayez d’examiner le risque et le rendement, vous constaterez peut-être qu’il y a plus de rendement par rapport au risque dans cette entreprise », a-t-il noté.
« Les investisseurs le comprennent, il y a donc un coût. »
Lire la suite [1]

[1] https://igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Rogers-_-«-Le-pire-cas-»-pour-les-sociétés-à-double-catégorie-d’actions-_-La-Presse_Novembre-2021.pdf]]></content>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>« IGOPP defends dual-class share structures »</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/igopp-defends-dual-class-share-structures/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/igopp-defends-dual-class-share-structures/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2019 22:28:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IGOPP Site web]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Actions multivotantes]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Shareholders]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/igopp-defends-dual-class-share-structures/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[« Dual-class share structures have drawn the ire of some investors, citing concerns with shareholder rights. For more on this and why he thinks there&#8217;s a place for dual-class shares, BNN Bloomberg spoke with Yvan Allaire, executive chair at the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations. » Pour voir l&#8217;entrevue, veuillez cliquer ici.]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[« Dual-class share structures have drawn the ire of some investors, citing concerns with shareholder rights.

For more on this and why he thinks there's a place for dual-class shares, BNN Bloomberg spoke with Yvan Allaire, executive chair at the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations. »

Pour voir l'entrevue, veuillez cliquer ici. [1]

 [2]

[1] https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/investing/video/igopp-defends-dual-class-share-structures~1606229
[2] https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/investing/video/igopp-defends-dual-class-share-structures~1606229]]></content>
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		</item>
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		<title>« How a proposed new ‘right’ for shareholders could badly damage corporate boards »</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/who-should-pick-board-members-3/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/who-should-pick-board-members-3/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2017 15:52:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IGOPP Site web]]></dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/who-should-pick-board-members-3/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[« There is a frenzied rush to get/give a new ‘right” to shareholders, the right to put up their own nominees for board membership. Boards of directors, so goes a dominant opinion, are not to be fully trusted to pick the right kind of people as directors or to shift the membership swiftly as circumstances [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[« There is a frenzied rush to get/give a new ‘right” to shareholders, the right to put up their own nominees for board membership. Boards of directors, so goes a dominant opinion, are not to be fully trusted to pick the right kind of people as directors or to shift the membership swiftly as circumstances change, unless some Damocles sword is installed over their heads.

By the end of the 2017 proxy season, 60% of S&#38;P 500 companies had, voluntarily or forcibly, adopted proxy access for board nominations. The following provisions have become standard: ownership of 3% of a company’s voting shares for at least three years, and the right to nominate up to 20% of the board by a shareholder or group of up to 20 shareholders.

This access to voting proxies is about to become an integral part of corporate governance in Canada. All banks have come on board, though still claiming that the existing legal threshold of 5% should be maintained.

The Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG) has now come out swinging in support of this practice for all publicly traded companies. (Janet McFarland and James Bradshaw, Globe and Mail; November 30th 2017)

It is very unlikely that major corporations will try to oppose the movement as many institutional investors are fiercely supportive of this measure. However, the eventual impact of this initiative on corporate governance raises important issues that seem totally absent from the discussions around this new “right” of shareholders.

Proxy access may have adverse effect on internal board dynamics 

Shareholder access to the director nomination process brings forth a host of issues related to its application as well as a significant risk of adverse effects on board dynamics including:

 	A partial takeover of a responsibility historically assumed exclusively by the board;
 	the implicit belief that directors are only accountable to the shareholders and have a duty to promote exclusively the interests of shareholders, in spite of two Supreme court’s interpretation of the board’s responsibility to include other stakeholders;
 	the reputational issues of the directors submitted to a contested election and the self‑protective behaviour this would bring about;
 	the actual risk of secret negotiations being held between management and investors who are intending to propose nominees;
 	the overwhelming influence accruing to proxy voting advisory firms, whose clients would expect their voting recommendations on the nominees;
 	the risk that the independence of directors nominated by shareholders would be compromised or so perceived;
 	the risk of creating factions and a poisonous atmosphere within the board, which would hinder the proper functioning of the board;
 	the risk of ending up with a board deficient in relevant experience or competence;
 	the risk that the process be hijacked by single-issue groups of shareholders.

The consequences for an individual director being very publicly voted out of a board would be significant and painful, both in economic and reputational terms; this is true for both incumbent nominees and the new nominees proposed by the shareholders.

Faced with the risk and arbitrary nature of a contested election, the directors would try to promote their personal contributions with institutional investors (and proxy advisors), thus generating an unhealthy competition among colleagues. In any event, how would the thousands of shareholders, called upon to choose between several nominees, decide for which nominees to vote, which nominees to dismiss when the voting proxy contains more nominees than available seats?

Smaller institutional funds may well come to rely on proxy advisors (such as ISS or Glass Lewis), again increasing by tenfold the influence of these outfits on the governance of public corporations. These proxy advisors will propose, as per their usual practice, some obvious, measurable criteria to make this choice: age of the directors, number of years as a member of the board, which are, in fact, arbitrary criteria, uncorrelated with actual performance.

Even more likely, boards of directors will initiate discussions and negotiations with institutional investors who have indicated their intention to propose their own nominees in an effort to reach common ground. These secret negotiations are likely to result in some of the nominees proposed by institutional investors becoming the nominees of management and some current directors presumably viewed, more or less deservedly, as being weaker (older, longer tenure) forcibly retired.

Anyone believing that this process is likely to produce stronger boards in the long run needs to consider anew the risks imposed on current and prospective board members as well as the likely impact on the climate and dynamics of boards.

This list of plausible consequences from granting shareholders the right to propose their nominees for the board should give pause to this seemingly unstoppable rush and get some thoughtful governance specialists to push back. »

&#160;

Les opinions exprimées dans ce texte n'engagent que l'auteur.
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