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	<title>IGOPPSecurities and Exchange Commission &#8211; IGOPP</title>
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		<title>« Can America’s Companies Survive America’s Most Aggressive Investors? »</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/can-americas-companies-survive-americas-most-aggressive-investors/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/can-americas-companies-survive-americas-most-aggressive-investors/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2016 21:04:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[L’IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Activisme]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agences de conseil en vote]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fonds de couverture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gouvernance créatrice de valeurs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investisseurs institutionnels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parties prenantes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities and Exchange Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Atlantic]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/can-americas-companies-survive-americas-most-aggressive-investors-2/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#171;&#160;WILMINGTON, Del.—Ron Ozer was thrilled to get a job with DuPont, the two-centuries-old chemical company, when he finished his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1990. It was the place to go for young, ambitious chemists; it offered salary and benefits so generous that some people called it “Uncle Dupey.” For 26 years, he invented things for [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA["WILMINGTON, Del.—Ron Ozer was thrilled to get a job with DuPont, the two-centuries-old chemical company, when he finished his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1990. It was the place to go for young, ambitious chemists; it offered salary and benefits so generous that some people called it “Uncle Dupey.” For 26 years, he invented things for DuPont, filing patent after patent, working on renewable plastic bottles and polymers from the company’s Experimental Station, a research lab where Kevlar, Neoprene, and nylon were all invented.

Then, in January of this year, he was abruptly fired, along with hundreds of other employees at the Experimental Station, part of a company-wide wave of 1,700 layoffs, one-third of DuPont’s Delaware workforce. Globally, DuPont cut 10 percent [1] of its workforce, or 5,000 people in early 2016.

[ ... ]

But it’s activist investors who have really pushed short-term thinking and figured out how to profit from it, according to Stout. And data suggests that, on the whole, activist investors are not good for employees or for the economy. Companies targeted by activist investors saw employment drop by 4 percent between 2008 and 2013, while all companies on average grew employment nine percent, on average, according to a 2015 study [2], “Hedge Fund Activism: Preliminary Results and Some New Empirical Evidence,” by Yvan Allaire, executive chair of the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations, a Canadian think tank that works on governance issues. Those who had specifically been targeted by activists advocating for cost reduction saw employment shrink 20 percent.

Of course, what this means is that these efforts undermine the livelihoods of thousands who work at these companies. As Allaire puts it, activists’ interventions are often merely a “wealth transfer to shareholders from the company’s employees.” But the problem extends even beyond those directly affected, to the health and ingenuity of the company as a whole. »

Lire la suite [3]

[1] http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-dupont-to-cut-10-percent-of-global-workforce-20151229-story.html
[2] http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20150401_Allaire.pdf
[3] https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/activist-investors/506330/]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>« Hedge Fund Activism: A Guide for the Perplexed »</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/hedge-fund-activism-a-guide-for-the-perplexed/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/hedge-fund-activism-a-guide-for-the-perplexed/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Jan 2016 15:08:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[L’IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Activisme]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Columbia Law School Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fonds de couverture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investisseurs institutionnels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities and Exchange Commission]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/hedge-fund-activism-a-guide-for-the-perplexed-2/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[« The message of the Dow/DuPont merger and split up is simple: No firm is today “too big to target.” Activists can see the transaction as evidence that, even in the rare case where they lose a proxy fight (as they did at DuPont last year in a squeaker), the handwriting is still on the [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[« The message of the Dow/DuPont merger and split up is simple: No firm is today “too big to target.” Activists can see the transaction as evidence that, even in the rare case where they lose a proxy fight (as they did at DuPont last year in a squeaker), the handwriting is still on the wall, and their game plan, if appealing, will ultimately prevail. Even though Trian could not win a majority vote to seat its candidates on the DuPont board, it held onto its stake, and the DuPont board quickly ditched their CEO in the wake of that fight and then approved the offer from Dow. Dow also was under pressure (from Third Point, an even more aggressive and short-tempered activist fund). The result was a marriage made somewhere other than in heaven.

Nor does this case stand alone. Lion Point Capital has now engaged Ally Financial (the former GMAC, which did fail in the wake of the 2008 crash), notwithstanding that Ally has been classified as a “systemically important financial institution” (or “SIFI”) by the FSOC. As soon as it became clear that even a SIFI could be stalked, AIG’s stock price began to soar, as market watchers predicted that it also would be targeted by activists seeking to downsize it. Lastly, MetLife downsized itself, beating activists to the punch in its effort to avoid being also classified as a SIFI [...]

Some data about the impact of hedge fund activism is clear: namely, its impact on research and development (“R&#38;D”).  One study by Allaire and Dauphin used the FactSet database to track the impact of a hedge fund “engagement” on R&#38;D expenditures and found that over the four-year period following a hedge fund engagement, R&#38;D expenditures at “surviving” target firms declined by more than 50% (expressed as a percentage of sales).  This statistic likely understates the full impact, as not all target firms “survive” (i.e., they are acquired in a merger or they are broken-up in a restructuring), and in these cases the decline in R&#38;D expenditures (although not measurable from financial reports) is almost certainly greater.  This study did use a control, and in the control group R&#38;D expenditures actually rose (modestly) over the same period, thus suggesting that causation is clear. »

Lire la suite [1]

&#160;

[1] http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/01/25/hedge-fund-activism-a-guide-for-the-perplexed/]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>« Can A New Paradigm For Corp Governance End A 30 Years War? »</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/can-a-new-paradigm-for-corp-governance-end-a-30-years-war/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/can-a-new-paradigm-for-corp-governance-end-a-30-years-war/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2015 19:08:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[L’IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Activisme]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fonds de couverture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gouvernance américaine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investisseurs institutionnels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parties prenantes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities and Exchange Commission]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/can-a-new-paradigm-for-corp-governance-end-a-30-years-war-2/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[« The decades-long conflict that is currently raging over short-termism and activist hedge funds strikes me as analogous to the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th Century, albeit fought with statistics (“empirical evidence”), op-eds and journal articles rather than cannon, pike and sword. I decided, after some thirty-six years in the front line of the [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[« The decades-long conflict that is currently raging over short-termism and activist hedge funds strikes me as analogous to the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th Century, albeit fought with statistics (“empirical evidence”), op-eds and journal articles rather than cannon, pike and sword. I decided, after some thirty-six years in the front line of the army defending corporations and their boards, that pursuing the thought might result in an essay more interesting (and perhaps a bit more amusing) than my usual memos and articles.

In 1618, after two centuries of religious disputation and tenuous co-existence, the ascension of the staunchly partisan Ferdinand II as Holy Roman Emperor sparked a revolt that disrupted the balance of power in Europe and began the Thirty Years’ War. The War quickly involved the major powers of Europe. The conflict resulted in the Peace of Westphalia and the redrawing of the religious and political map of Europe, a new paradigm for the governance of Europe.

In 1985, a century of disputation as to the roles of professional management, boards of directors and shareholders of public companies similarly resulted in the disruption of the balance of power and general prosperity. In the two decades immediately preceding 1985, corporate raiders had perfected the front-end-loaded, two-tier, junk-bond-financed, bust-up tender offer, using tactics such as the “Highly Confident Letter” to launch a takeover without firm financing, “greenmail” (accumulating a block of stock and threatening a takeover bid unless the target company repurchases the block at a premium to the market) and litigation attacking protective state laws. Public companies did not have sufficient time or means to defend against corporate raiders. The battles culminated in two key 1985 decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court that restored the balance of power between boards of directors and opportunistic shareholders. In the Unocal case, the court upheld the power of the board of directors to reject, and take action to defeat, a hostile takeover bid, and in the Household case, it sustained the legality of the poison pill, which I had introduced three years earlier in an effort to level the playing field between corporate raiders and the companies they targeted. »

Lire la suite [1]

[1] http://thefirm.moneycontrol.com/story_page.php?autono=3450941]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>&#171;&#160;Activism, Short-Termism, and the SEC&#160;&#187;</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec-remarks-at-the-21st-annual-stanford-directors-college/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec-remarks-at-the-21st-annual-stanford-directors-college/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2015 20:34:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[L’IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Activisme]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agences de conseil en vote]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fonds de couverture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gouvernance créatrice de valeurs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities and Exchange Commission]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://igopp.org/?p=5269</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#171;&#160;Today, I’d like to pull together some themes that I have been thinking, speaking, and writing about during my tenure and address them more holistically. Specifically, I’d like to share with you some thoughts about shareholder activism, short-termism, and the SEC. I. What is activism? Like many others, I view activism broadly: it is simply [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA["Today, I’d like to pull together some themes that I have been thinking, speaking, and writing about during my tenure and address them more holistically. Specifically, I’d like to share with you some thoughts about shareholder activism, short-termism, and the SEC.
I. What is activism?
Like many others, I view activism broadly: it is simply the actions of investors who are dissatisfied with management’s decision-making and corporate strategy and who, rather than selling their shares, try to force those companies to change.[1] [1] But why bother? Despite the best efforts of certain policymakers over the last six years, the U.S. capital markets are still the deepest and most liquid in the world, and for many investors, it is trivially easy to exit one’s investment by selling and walking away. But an index fund manager can’t just sell the shares of the companies in the index. A hedge fund manager may see more alpha in driving improvements at a single company than in stock-picking. And a socially-motivated investment fund manager or gadfly can get a platform for idiosyncratic goals.

Are these activists good or bad? Often this question is posed as Manichean: light vs dark, good vs evil. This binary view of the world, divided between those who are either pro- or anti-activism, is convenient, but it is also far too simplistic. We need to break down activism one degree further, and ask: is it aimed at creating long-term shareholder wealth, and does it actually do so?[2] [2] Some activism is, and does; other activism is not, or does not.[3] [3]
II. The SEC’s role regarding activism
So how does the SEC determine which is which? Simple: it doesn’t, and shouldn’t. The various states have been entrusted with determining the substantive rights of shareholders, while the SEC’s role traditionally has been to set the proper conditions for investors to be able to make an intelligent, informed determination for themselves — that is, to create a level playing field, chiefly through disclosure.[4] [4] And traditionally, the SEC has been an expert groundskeeper. Unfortunately, that prudent division of responsibilities has been eroded, in some instances through our own actions or inaction in the face of changing markets, and other times through our own overzealous implementation of legislative enactments. As a result, as groundskeepers go, the SEC increasingly has more in common with Caddyshack’s Carl Spackler.[5] [5] Maybe this is due to our relentless pursuit of the many gophers in the Dodd-Frank Act over the last five years! I would like to discuss a few specific areas to illustrate my point."

Lire la suite [6]

[1] http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec.html#_edn1
[2] http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec.html#_edn2
[3] http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec.html#_edn3
[4] http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec.html#_edn4
[5] http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec.html#_edn5
[6] http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec.html#_ftn17]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>« The State of Corporate Governance for 2015 »</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/the-state-of-corporate-governance-for-2015/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/the-state-of-corporate-governance-for-2015/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Jan 2015 16:59:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[L’IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Activisme]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agences de conseil en vote]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fonds de couverture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Harvard Law School Forum]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities and Exchange Commission]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://igopp.org/?p=4452</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Financial Activism « Over the past three years, the number and intensity of financial activism initiatives has increased. The ongoing debate on the wealth effects of hedge fund activism is worth following and is well-covered on Harvard’s corporate governance blog (blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov). Although financial activism may return immediate wealth to some shareholders through the sale of [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Financial Activism

« Over the past three years, the number and intensity of financial activism initiatives has increased. The ongoing debate on the wealth effects of hedge fund activism is worth following and is well-covered on Harvard’s corporate governance blog (blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov [1]). Although financial activism may return immediate wealth to some shareholders through the sale of assets, payment of special dividends or share buybacks, evidence is mounting that this may be at the expense of the longer term corporate and societal interests. For example, a July 2014 paper by Yuan Allaire and Francois Dauphin, “Activist” Hedge Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth? (available at www.igopp.org [2]), concludes that “the most generous conclusion one may reach” is that activist funds “create some short-term wealth for some shareholders” because investors tend to jump into the stock of targeted companies upon the announcement of activist activity.

“In a minority of cases, activist hedge funds may bring some lasting value for shareholders but largely at the expense of workers and bond holders; thus the impact of activist hedge funds appears to take the form of wealth transfer rather than wealth creation.”

The research further notes that hedge funds tend to be focused on the short term, with half of interventions not lasting nine months. In addition, a growing number of commentators, including senior representatives of some institutional investors, have expressed concern about the impact of hedge fund activism, and associated increased debt and cuts in capital spending, on long-term corporate health, innovation, job creation and GDP growth." Lire la suite [3]

[1] http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
[2] http://www.igopp.org
[3] http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2015/01/30/the-state-of-corporate-governance-for-2015/#more-68056]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Threat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge Funds</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Jan 2015 16:52:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[L’IGOPP dans les médias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Activisme]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fonds de couverture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gouvernance américaine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Harvard Law School Forum]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investisseurs institutionnels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities and Exchange Commission]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://igopp.org/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds-2/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[“ A paper by Dr. Yvan Allaire entitled “The Value of ‘Just Say No,’” and also memos by our firm (here and here, the latter memo discussed on the Forum here), demonstrated that an ISS client note entitled “The IRR of No,” which argued that companies that had “just said no” to hostile takeover bids [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[“ A paper by Dr. Yvan Allaire entitled “The Value of ‘Just Say No,’” and also memos by our firm (here  [1]and here [2], the latter memo discussed on the Forum here [3]), demonstrated that an ISS client note entitled “The IRR of No,” which argued that companies that had “just said no” to hostile takeover bids incurred profoundly negative returns, suffered from critical methodological and analytical flaws that undermined its conclusions.

Dr. Allaire also presented a sophisticated analysis contained in two papers (“Activist Hedge Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth? What Do the Empirical Studies Really Say?” and “Hedge Fund Activism and Their Long-Term Consequences; Unanswered Questions to Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang”), consistent with our firm’s earlier observations [4] (discussed on the Forum here [5]), offering a devastating critique of Professor Bebchuk’s research claiming to show that attacks by activist hedge funds did not destroy long-term value.” Lire la suite [6]

[1] http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.23591.14.pdf
[2] http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.23683.14.pdf
[3] http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/12/09/just-say-no/
[4] http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.22752.13.pdf
[5] http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/26/the-bebchuk-syllogism/
[6] http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2015/01/14/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds/]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Avis relatif aux indications à l’intention des agences de conseil en vote</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/indications-a-lintention-des-agences-de-conseil-en-vote/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/indications-a-lintention-des-agences-de-conseil-en-vote/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2014 20:12:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mémoires et avis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agences de conseil en vote]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Législation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities and Exchange Commission]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://igopp.org/?p=3344</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[L&#8217;IGOPP a publié en 2013 une prise de position portant précisément sur le sujet des agences de conseil en vote. Cette prise de position, intitulée Le rôle préoccupant des agences de conseil en vote (“proxy advisors”): quelques recommandations de politiques, explique les fondements de notre réflexion. Plusieurs éléments de réponse aux questions soulevées dans l’Avis [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[L'IGOPP a publié en 2013 une prise de position portant précisément sur le sujet des agences de conseil en vote. Cette prise de position, intitulée Le rôle préoccupant des agences de conseil en vote (“proxy advisors”): quelques recommandations de politiques [1], explique les fondements de notre réflexion. Plusieurs éléments de réponse aux questions soulevées dans l’Avis de consultation proviennent intégralement de cette prise de position. Aussi, nous la joignons en annexe au présent document pour que le lecteur puisse s’y référer facilement.

De façon générale, l'IGOPP croit qu’encourager les agences de conseil en vote à prendre des indications en considération lors de l’élaboration et la mise en œuvre de leurs pratiques est en soi louable, mais nettement insuffisant. En effet, des mesures normatives sont requises pour assurer un encadrement approprié des activités de ces agences qui bénéficient désormais d’une influence notable auprès de nombreux acteurs des marchés financiers.

Plusieurs sujets sont traités dans le cadre du Projet d’Avis 25-201. L'IGOPP les aborde en répondant aux questions spécifiques formulées dans le cadre de l’avis de consultation.

[1] http://igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PP_RolePreoccupantConseilllersVote-pp7_Allaire_FR-singlepage-SHORT_v2.pdf]]></content>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>&#171;&#160;Just say no to the myth of shareholder democracy&#160;&#187;</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/just-say-no-to-the-myth-of-shareholder-democracy-2/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/just-say-no-to-the-myth-of-shareholder-democracy-2/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Jun 2014 19:32:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles d’actualités]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Actionnaires]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Offres d'achat hostiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities and Exchange Commission]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://igopp.org/?p=3232</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#171;&#160;It is tiresome indeed to debate with people who never respond to your fundamental arguments. Instead, they wrap themselves in the spurious argument of “shareholder democracy”. If corporations were to apply the principles of citizen democracy, tourists-shareholders would not have the right to vote and newcomers to shareholding would have to wait a good period [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA["It is tiresome indeed to debate with people who never respond to your fundamental arguments. Instead, they wrap themselves in the spurious argument of “shareholder democracy”. If corporations were to apply the principles of citizen democracy, tourists-shareholders would not have the right to vote and newcomers to shareholding would have to wait a good period of time before acquiring the right to vote.

They basically claim that boards are incompetent, biased, conflicted and, thus, should not be left to decide what is in the best interest of the company. They rehash the quaint notion that management is, ipso facto, against the takeover of their company because of inherent conflicts of interest; yet, because of the changes in compensation system for executives and board members, the concern has become that management and boards may be too receptive to a takeover offer that may not be in the interest of the corporation and its stakeholders. The potential conflict of interest has switched side.

They might go so far as to claim that the Supreme Court of Canada has not clearly stated in BCE v. debenture holders (2008) that:
[38] The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual concept. It is not confined to short-term profit or share value. Where the corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to the long-term interests of the corporation.

[40] In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decisions.

Courts should give appropriate deference to the business judgment of directors who take into account these ancillary interests, as reflected by the business judgment rule… It reflects the reality that directors, who are mandated under s. 102(1) of the CBCA to manage the corporation’s business and affairs, are often better suited to determine what is in the best interests of the corporation."

Lire la suite [1]

[1] http://igopp.org/en/just-say-no-to-the-myth-of-shareholder-democracy/]]></content>
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		<item>
		<title>&#171;&#160;After the meltdown&#160;&#187;</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/after-the-meltdownregulating-the-financial-markets/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/after-the-meltdownregulating-the-financial-markets/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Mar 2011 03:27:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles d’actualités]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crise financière]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Législation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities and Exchange Commission]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://igopp.org/?p=3935</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[« The financial crisis of 2007-08 has generated new rules, regulations and guidelines to cope with the flaws and faults of the international financial system. What kind of regulatory context is likely to evolve from this massive effort? Will it be sufficient to prevent the next bubble and crisis? Or is this only a political operation to placate [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[« The financial crisis of 2007-08 has generated new rules, regulations and guidelines to cope with the flaws and faults of the international financial system. What kind of regulatory context is likely to evolve from this massive effort? Will it be sufficient to prevent the next bubble and crisis? Or is this only a political operation to placate an angry population? Clearly, the sum total of new rules and regulations once fully implemented would prevent a crisis of the same form and nature as the last one. But will it prevent the next one? That is the question.

La crise financière de 2007-2008 a produit quantité de nouvelles règles, réglementations et lignes directrices visant à contenir les excès et anomalies du système financier international. Quel environnement réglementaire naîtra de tous ces efforts ? Suffira-t-il à prévenir la prochaine bulle spéculative ? N’assiste-t-on pas plutôt à une manoeuvre politique d’apaisement des citoyens ? Certes, la pleine application de ces mesures préviendrait une crise de même forme et de même nature. Mais à quoi ressemblera la prochaine ? Voilà la question…  »

[...] Lire la suite [1]

[1] http://igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Policy-Options-After-meltdown-Yvan-allaire.pdf]]></content>
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