Contenu pour le mot clé: Agences de conseil en vote

30 novembre 2015

« Who Should Pick Board Members? »

« There is a frenzied rush for shareholders to get a new ‘right”, the right to put up their own nominees for board membership. Boards of directors, so goes a dominant opinion, are not to be fully trusted to pick the right kind of people as directors or to shift the membership swiftly as circumstances […]

10 novembre 2015

Le vote consultatif sur la rémunération des dirigeants : Une expérience concluante?

Si les actionnaires pouvaient s’exprimer directement sur les programmes de rémunération, les conseils d’administration seraient-ils plus judicieux, plus modérés en matière de rémunération des dirigeants, plus à l’écoute des avis des investisseurs institutionnels. De prime abord, cela semble raisonnable, voire indéniable. Jouissant d’une popularité certaine auprès des investisseurs institutionnels ainsi que d’un appui politique opportuniste, […]

4 novembre 2015

« IGOPP’s Policy Paper on Proxy Access by Shareholders to the Director Nomination Process »

« The board of the Institute for Governance (IGOPP) unanimously approved a Policy paper on Proxy Access by Shareholders to the Director Nomination Process. The prerogative to nominate the members of the board, which has historically been the sole responsibility of boards of directors, has now been challenged by institutional funds determined to acquire the […]

5 octobre 2015

« Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace? »

« The decades-long conflict that is currently raging over short-termism and activist hedge funds strikes me as analogous to the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th Century, albeit fought with statistics (“empirical evidence”), op-eds and journal articles rather than cannon, pike and sword. I decided, after some thirty-six years in the front line of the […]

23 juin 2015

« Activism, Short-Termism, and the SEC »

« Today, I’d like to pull together some themes that I have been thinking, speaking, and writing about during my tenure and address them more holistically. Specifically, I’d like to share with you some thoughts about shareholder activism, short-termism, and the SEC. I. What is activism? Like many others, I view activism broadly: it is simply […]

25 mai 2015

« The case for and against activist hedge funds »

« A subset of so-called hedge funds, henceforth known as “activists”, has latched on the idea that many corporations are not managed or governed in a manner likely to maximize value for shareholders. With the capital they have obtained from pension funds and other institutional investors, they take a small position in the equity of publicly […]

6 février 2015

« Engagement and Activism in the 2015 Proxy Season »

« Yet companies, boards, and other investors should keep in mind that shareholder activism is often merely a tactic in a self-interested investment strategy. Shareholder activists such as hedge funds typically are pursuing short-term financial gain at the expense of long-term shareholders and stakeholders. These funds welcome the support of academics and theorists who argue that […]

30 janvier 2015

« The State of Corporate Governance for 2015 »

Financial Activism « Over the past three years, the number and intensity of financial activism initiatives has increased. The ongoing debate on the wealth effects of hedge fund activism is worth following and is well-covered on Harvard’s corporate governance blog ( Although financial activism may return immediate wealth to some shareholders through the sale of […]

9 décembre 2014

“Just Say No”

« On October 22, 2014, Institutional Shareholder Services issued a note to clients entitled “The IRR of ‘No’.” The note argues that shareholders of companies that have successfully “just said no” to hostile takeover bids have incurred “profoundly negative” returns. In a note we issued the same day, we called attention to critical methodological and analytical […]

6 novembre 2014

« The value of “just say no”: A Response to ISS »

« On October 22nd 2014, ISS published a note on the financial consequences for shareholders to vote “NO” to a proposed takeover. The ISS note, and its conclusion, comes at a propitious time for the Valeant cum Pershing Square attempt to take over Allergan. The shareholders of Allergan, who may get to vote on this […]

16 juillet 2014

Avis relatif aux indications à l’intention des agences de conseil en vote

L’IGOPP a publié en 2013 une prise de position portant précisément sur le sujet des agences de conseil en vote. Cette prise de position, intitulée Le rôle préoccupant des agences de conseil en vote (“proxy advisors”): quelques recommandations de politiques, explique les fondements de notre réflexion. Plusieurs éléments de réponse aux questions soulevées dans l’Avis […]

16 juillet 2014

Commentaire de l’IGOPP aux ACVM et à l’AMF relatif aux agences de conseil en vote

L’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP) a soumis son commentaire aux Autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières (« ACVM ») et à l’Autorité des marchés financiers concernant le Projet d’Avis 25-201 relatif aux indications à l’intention des agences de conseil en vote. L’IGOPP a publié en 2013 une prise de position portant précisément sur le sujet des agences de […]

20 mars 2014

Le rôle préoccupant des gestionnaires de procuration

L’évolution du contexte économique a créé une occasion d’affaires. À mesure que les investisseurs institutionnels et les gestionnaires de fonds en venaient à détenir collectivement une proportion largement majoritaire de toutes les actions en circulation, leur obligation fiduciaire d’exercer les droits de vote représentés par leurs procurations, créait un problème logistique. Les conseillers en vote, […]

8 mars 2013

7ième prise de position de l’IGOPP

Cette prise de position formule des recommandations aux investisseurs institutionnels en tant que principaux clients des conseillers en vote, et aux autorités en valeurs mobilières en tant que protecteurs de l’intégrité des marchés financiers. Pour de multiples raisons, les agences de conseil en vote en sont venues à exercer une influence démesurée sur la gouvernance […]

27 février 2013

« No supervision of proxy advisory firms »

« The Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations is calling on regulators to require that proxy advisory firms ensure accuracy, provide transparency and avoid conflicts of interest in their recommendations and dealings. The institute is an independent organization based in Montreal whose founders include activist investor firm Jarislowsky Fraser Ltd. Its mandate is to […]

6 novembre 2012

« Notes on a flawed study »

« In October 2012, Investor Responsibility Research (IRRC) Institute and ISS, the proxy management firm, jointly published a study purporting to assess the relative performance of controlled companies listed on exchanges in the United States (the S&P 1500 Composite Index). The study has received little notice in the Canadian media (but for the Globe and Mail, […]