Contenu pour le mot clé: Agences de conseil en vote

31 juillet 2019

« Finding Friends is Hard: Long-Term Investors’ Relationship with Proxy Advisors, Activists and Private Equity Funds »

« Institutional investors are howling for US public companies to focus more on the long-term.[1]  This is unsurprising. Long-term focused companies produce significantly better results over time, reporting far greater revenue growth with less volatility, far higher levels of economic profit, and greater total return to shareholders.[2] So if you are holding stock for a long time, […]

2 mai 2019

« CPPIB backs investor group in bid to end Bombardier’s dual-class share structure »

« CPPIB is backing a proposal to end Bombardier Inc.’s dual class share structure and remove the control of the founding family, forcing the company onto the defensive as it hosts investors for its annual meeting Thursday. Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, which oversees assets worth about $368-billion and is one of Bombardier’s 25 biggest […]

21 avril 2019

« As vote challenging Bombardier’s share structure faces defeat, Médac calls for legislative reform »

« Investor-rights group Médac acknowledges its bid to end Bombardier Inc.’s dual-class share system is destined to fail, but says it has no better option to trigger a discussion on what it sees as a critical issue. The Montreal-based organization is calling for changes to the laws governing Canadian companies that give extra voting rights […]

12 avril 2019

Fronde contre le contrôle familial de Bombardier

Deux influentes firmes américaines mettent leur poids derrière une proposition du Mouvement d’éducation et de défense des actionnaires (MÉDAC) visant à mettre fin au contrôle de Bombardier par la famille de son fondateur. Les descendants de Joseph-Armand Bombardier détiennent à peine 12,2 % des actions de la multinationale, mais ils contrôlent 50,9 % des voix […]

11 avril 2019

Actions: Bombardier ne changera pas sa structure

Bombardier n’a pas l’intention de modifier sa structure d’actionnariat en dépit de l’appui des deux principales agences de conseil aux actionnaires à une proposition visant à abolir les actions à droits de vote multiples. Glass Lewis et Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) endossent la démarche du Mouvement d’éducation et de défense des actionnaires (MÉDAC), qui estime […]

21 juin 2018

« Why Canadian CEO pay has soared over the past decade »

« When shareholders of Canada’s big banks opened their proxy voting forms in early 2008, they found a striking new proposal on the ballot. Submitted by a small ethical mutual fund company, the resolution called on banks to give investors an annual vote on how executive pay was designed. Bank boards initially opposed the motion […]

16 avril 2018

Les actions multivotantes sont-elles préjudiciables pour les actionnaires ?

Nous avons souvent publié des billets qui abordent diverses conséquences liées à l’émission d’actions à votes multiples. L’article intitulé, « ACTIONS MULTIVOTANTES : LE MODÈLE DE BOMBARDIER SOULÈVE DES VAGUES », publié dans La Presse le 21 juillet 2015 avait d’ailleurs fait couler beaucoup d’encre. Ces émissions d’actions sont-elles fondées, justifiées, légitimes et équitables dans le contexte de la gouvernance […]

5 avril 2018

« It’s hunting season, as activists and regulators open fire on Canada’s businesses »

« The corporate hunting season is officially underway, an annual ritual during which shareholder parties, armed with proxies and other weapons of democratic destruction, set out to bag executives and directors for failing to deliver. The list of potential corporate failings is all encompassing. Anything and everything is a target, from executive compensation to diversity […]

5 avril 2018

« Executive pay: time for change ? »

« A highly standardized process leads to yearly executive pay packages which combine salary, bonuses, stock options, restricted stock grants, performance share units, retirement benefits. The full assemblage will also include formal contracts covering change-of-control situations, termination conditions, etc.  Only the quanta of the compensation package vary from firm to firm. Whenever “long-term” performance objectives […]

17 novembre 2017

« Pershing Square, Ackman and CP Rail: A Case of Successful «Activism» ? »

« Pershing Square, an activist hedge fund owned and managed by William Ackman, began hostile maneuvers against the board of CP Rail in September 2011 and ended its association with CP in August 2016, having netted a profit of $2.6 billion for his fund. This Canadian saga, in many ways, an archetype of what hedge fund […]

13 avril 2017

La rémunération des dirigeants: Comment en sommes-nous arrivés là?

Plusieurs évènements ont façonné le contexte actuel de la rémunération des dirigeants d’entreprises: Au Canada, depuis 1992, les rémunérations des 5 dirigeants les mieux payés sont divulguées, ce qui permet des comparaisons entre entreprises et au sein d’une même entreprise; Suite aux fiascos à la Enron et aux crises financières comme celle de 2008, un […]

18 novembre 2016

« Can America’s Companies Survive America’s Most Aggressive Investors? »

« WILMINGTON, Del.—Ron Ozer was thrilled to get a job with DuPont, the two-centuries-old chemical company, when he finished his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1990. It was the place to go for young, ambitious chemists; it offered salary and benefits so generous that some people called it “Uncle Dupey.” For 26 years, he invented things for […]

13 septembre 2016

« Making Say-on-Pay Vote Binding: A Good Idea? »

« The practice of a non-binding say-on-pay vote by shareholders spread quickly and broadly. It seemed that, finally, shareholders would be given the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with outrageous or ill-conceived compensation packages. The practice, at first, was voluntary with companies agreeing to submit their compensation policies to a vote. Then, as the number […]

21 avril 2016

« Two flawed studies about controlled corporations by ISS and IRRCI »

« The performance of controlled companies has been a contentious issue. For different reasons, various parties have worked hard at convincing the investor class that capital structures other than one-share, one-vote would produce inferior results for shareholders. Consequently, most investment funds frown upon such structures, at best tolerate them, and, at worst, have adopted policies of non-investment in these […]

28 décembre 2015

« Who should pick corporate directors? »

« Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin cogently analyze the costs and risks of proxy access, arguing that « Anyone believing that this process is likely to produce stronger boards in the long run needs to consider anew the calculus of current and prospective board members, the actions, likely dysfunctional, of people facing the humiliation (and economic loss) […]

8 décembre 2015

« Is 2015, Like 1985, an Inflection Year? »

« In an October 2015 post, I posed the question: Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace to the Thirty Years’ War? As we approach the end of 2015, I thought it would be useful to note some of the most cogent recent developments on which the need, and hope, for a new […]