Contenu pour le mot clé: Agences de conseil en vote

21 juin 2018

« Why Canadian CEO pay has soared over the past decade »

« When shareholders of Canada’s big banks opened their proxy voting forms in early 2008, they found a striking new proposal on the ballot. Submitted by a small ethical mutual fund company, the resolution called on banks to give investors an annual vote on how executive pay was designed. Bank boards initially opposed the motion […]

16 avril 2018

Les actions multivotantes sont-elles préjudiciables pour les actionnaires ?

Nous avons souvent publié des billets qui abordent diverses conséquences liées à l’émission d’actions à votes multiples. L’article intitulé, « ACTIONS MULTIVOTANTES : LE MODÈLE DE BOMBARDIER SOULÈVE DES VAGUES », publié dans La Presse le 21 juillet 2015 avait d’ailleurs fait couler beaucoup d’encre. Ces émissions d’actions sont-elles fondées, justifiées, légitimes et équitables dans le contexte de la gouvernance […]

5 avril 2018

« It’s hunting season, as activists and regulators open fire on Canada’s businesses »

« The corporate hunting season is officially underway, an annual ritual during which shareholder parties, armed with proxies and other weapons of democratic destruction, set out to bag executives and directors for failing to deliver. The list of potential corporate failings is all encompassing. Anything and everything is a target, from executive compensation to diversity […]

5 avril 2018

« Executive pay: time for change ? »

« A highly standardized process leads to yearly executive pay packages which combine salary, bonuses, stock options, restricted stock grants, performance share units, retirement benefits. The full assemblage will also include formal contracts covering change-of-control situations, termination conditions, etc.  Only the quanta of the compensation package vary from firm to firm. Whenever “long-term” performance objectives […]

17 novembre 2017

« Pershing Square, Ackman and CP Rail: A Case of Successful «Activism» ? »

« Pershing Square, an activist hedge fund owned and managed by William Ackman, began hostile maneuvers against the board of CP Rail in September 2011 and ended its association with CP in August 2016, having netted a profit of $2.6 billion for his fund. This Canadian saga, in many ways, an archetype of what hedge fund […]

13 avril 2017

La rémunération des dirigeants: Comment en sommes-nous arrivés là?

Plusieurs évènements ont façonné le contexte actuel de la rémunération des dirigeants d’entreprises: Au Canada, depuis 1992, les rémunérations des 5 dirigeants les mieux payés sont divulguées, ce qui permet des comparaisons entre entreprises et au sein d’une même entreprise; Suite aux fiascos à la Enron et aux crises financières comme celle de 2008, un […]

18 novembre 2016

« Can America’s Companies Survive America’s Most Aggressive Investors? »

« WILMINGTON, Del.—Ron Ozer was thrilled to get a job with DuPont, the two-centuries-old chemical company, when he finished his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1990. It was the place to go for young, ambitious chemists; it offered salary and benefits so generous that some people called it “Uncle Dupey.” For 26 years, he invented things for […]

13 septembre 2016

« Making Say-on-Pay Vote Binding: A Good Idea? »

« The practice of a non-binding say-on-pay vote by shareholders spread quickly and broadly. It seemed that, finally, shareholders would be given the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with outrageous or ill-conceived compensation packages. The practice, at first, was voluntary with companies agreeing to submit their compensation policies to a vote. Then, as the number […]

21 avril 2016

« Two flawed studies about controlled corporations by ISS and IRRCI »

« The performance of controlled companies has been a contentious issue. For different reasons, various parties have worked hard at convincing the investor class that capital structures other than one-share, one-vote would produce inferior results for shareholders. Consequently, most investment funds frown upon such structures, at best tolerate them, and, at worst, have adopted policies of non-investment in these […]

28 décembre 2015

« Who should pick corporate directors? »

« Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin cogently analyze the costs and risks of proxy access, arguing that « Anyone believing that this process is likely to produce stronger boards in the long run needs to consider anew the calculus of current and prospective board members, the actions, likely dysfunctional, of people facing the humiliation (and economic loss) […]