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		<title>Davos: Seven years later</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/davos-seven-years-later/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/davos-seven-years-later/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2017 21:10:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publications ]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/?p=7211</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There is a Chinese proverb that says He who knows he has enough is rich; but the modern Western version of the saying seems to be: One never has enough; I deserve more; or There is always someone who has more. Over the last years, we have built a system of incentives and motives so [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[There is a Chinese proverb that says He who knows he has enough is rich; but the modern Western version of the saying seems to be: One never has enough; I deserve more; or There is always someone who has more.

Over the last years, we have built a system of incentives and motives so powerful that it overwhelmed values. Ethics is the resistance of values under pressure. But there is a breaking point. Enough pressure will grind values down. Heroes and saints do what they think is right whatever the costs and consequences for them. Most mortals, mes semblables, mes frères, dirait Baudelaire, are suspended in webs of motives and meanings they themselves have spun. We must understand how we have come to spin this web and learn to spin a new one.

There is something special about this panel. I am surrounded by representatives of very successful organizations: a banking cooperative (Grameen Bank), a professional partnership (Deloitte), a faith-based transformational organization (Sojourners), a large family-owned company (Bettersman); a publicly listed corporation with a stable network of shareholders (Takeda Pharmaceuticals); a publicly listed corporation with a controlling shareholder (Thomson-Reuters).

As I am sure my fellow panelists will testify, in all these organizations, values of trust and loyalty as well as a long-term perspective are alive and well. But what, or who is missing at this table? Precisely, the most prevalent type of corporations in several countries; that is:

 	Stock exchange listed corporations ‘owned’ by a large number of ever-changing, transient funds, many with short-term performance goals as well as a bunch of share-flippers (the average holding period of shares of companies listed on the NYSE or NADAQ is now some 7 months);
 	Governed by directors who are thoroughly ‘independent’ but often lack legitimacy and credibility;
 	Managed by a mobile executive class motivated by stock options and other compensation schemes to work exclusively for these short-term shareholders;
 	Surrounded by speculators, hedge funds and various financial operators free to play all sorts of lucrative games with the company’s shares and debt.

Read more [1]

[1] http://www.corpgov.net/2017/02/yvan-allaire-world-economic-forum-davos-2010/]]></content>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Background and potential questions for a private session  with CEOs</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/background-and-potential-questions-for-a-private-session-with-ceos/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/background-and-potential-questions-for-a-private-session-with-ceos/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2014 18:11:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reports & Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stakeholders]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://igopp.org/?p=3218</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Dr. Yvan Allaire, Executive Chair of the Institute for Governance (IGOPP) and Chair of the Global Agenda Council on the Role of Business- World Economic Forum, has prepared this context paper on the Role of Business which have been presented at the 2014 Davos summit. According to Dr. Allaire, the long-term success and survival of a business [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Dr. Yvan Allaire, Executive Chair of the Institute for Governance (IGOPP) and Chair of the Global Agenda Council on the Role of Business- World Economic Forum, has prepared this context paper on the Role of Business which have been presented at the 2014 Davos summit.

According to Dr. Allaire, the long-term success and survival of a business depends, or will come to depend, on its ability to create value for its many stakeholders, on its pro-activity in coping with the social and environmental consequences of its operations.

There are no villains in this story, rather a system of ideas, pressures and incentives has come about which we must understand and change. What changes in which part of the current economic system are most likely to bring some movement in the right direction? Are there prime movers in the system? In other words, are there fundamental causes to the current state of affairs, which, if not directly addressed and changed, will thwart any effort at reform?

No one can know how the next ten years are likely to unfold, but as the world’s problems grow increasingly pressing, it is clear that the world of 2024 will not look like the world of 2014.

Already thousands of companies understand that financial success can only be sustained if the firm also creates social, environmental and ethical value. These firms are drawing on universal principles in areas such as human rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption to redefine their strategic and operating models, and they are exploring new disclosure and reporting standards in order to drive a “race to the top”. New forms of collaboration across industries, governments and civil society are emerging to shape the market conditions for entire industries, to bring about purpose-driven businesses.
]]></content>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>What is the role of business?</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/what-is-the-role-of-business/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/what-is-the-role-of-business/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2014 15:37:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stakeholders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Value-creating governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[World Economic Forum]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aimta712.org/?p=1778</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Any business is a risky endeavour with an uncertain life expectancy. It has been, and should remain, a driver of innovation, a creator of wealth, a harbinger of economic freedom. The core mission of a profit-driven enterprise is not to fulfil some philanthropic duty. But neither is it solely to maximize short-term shareholder value. The [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Any business is a risky endeavour with an uncertain life expectancy. It has been, and should remain, a driver of innovation, a creator of wealth, a harbinger of economic freedom. The core mission of a profit-driven enterprise is not to fulfil some philanthropic duty. But neither is it solely to maximize short-term shareholder value.

The fundamental role of business has remained relatively constant: providing the goods and services that people need or want. What has changed dramatically over time are the expectations placed on businesses. Boards of directors, management and investors of large corporations are now expected to address an array of social, economic and ecological challenges.

Business derives its social legitimacy and right to operate from the economic value it creates for society at large, from its performance for both investors and a wider network of constituencies, its partnership with governments and other agents in solving social problems, and the trust its leadership inspires in employees and society as a whole.

Yet, all indicators show a sharp drop in the trust bestowed on most institutions over the last 20 years. The most recent Edelman Trust Barometer, while noting some improvement over the past year, still paints a sorry picture: overall trust in business and government stand at 50% and 41% respectively worldwide. That is a disturbing statistic but even worse is the level of trust in the leadership of business and government, which stands at a dismal 18% and 13% respectively. When respondents are asked to identify the reasons for trusting business less, some 50% point to “corruption/fraud” and “wrong incentives driving business decisions”; when asked the same question for government, 50% indicate “corruption/fraud” and “poor performance/incompetence”.

For a period of time, say until 1980, most large business corporations did abide by the belief that “making money for shareholders” was not the be-all and end-all of business. In fact, the notion that business has a higher purpose than generating profits is rooted in some of the earliest business endeavours. It is manifest in a famous exchange between Henry Ford and the lawyer for the Dodge brothers who were suing Ford for slashing prices of the Model T:

“What”, he [Dodge’s lawyer] asked Ford, “is the purpose of the [Ford] company?”

“To do as much possible for everybody concerned”, responded Ford, “to make money and use it, give employment, and send out the car where the people can use it … and incidentally to make money …Business is a service not a bonanza.”

“Incidentally make money?” queried the attorney.

“Yes, sir.”

“But your controlling feature … is to employ a great army of men at high wages, to reduce the selling price of your car, so that a lot of people can buy it at a cheap price, and give everybody a car that wants one.”

“If you give all that,” replied Ford, “the money will fall into your hands; you can’t get out of it.”

(Quoted in The Economics of Higher Purpose [1])

Yet, over the last three decades, this stakeholder model of the corporation was, in many instances, discarded and replaced by a shareholder-centric view. The drivers of this shift are multiple, very dynamic and difficult to contain. An ideology of market efficiency certainly played a role but so have changes in compensation models throughout the economic system.

The dominant discourse claimed that free and global markets for capital, goods, services and people were the wave of the future, that “shareholder value-creation” was the essential, sometimes the only, goal of stock-market listed corporations.

The result, overall, has not been very good: too much greed infecting economic activities; recurring financial crises and business fiascos eroding trust in organizations, in public institutions and in their leadership; rising inequality; reduced social mobility; short-term profit maximization in every nook and cranny of the economic system; benign neglect of social problems; the pauperization of workers in developed economies. Indeed, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics informs us of the dismal fact that average weekly earnings and average hourly earnings in constant dollars in 2010 were significantly lower than in 1975.

A healthy society, and an effective organization for that matter, must find ways to balance and reconcile in its bosom the “humanist” and the “economist” who live in every one of us. The stakeholder model of the corporation did strike a delicate balance between the economic and humanist imperatives. Can it be reinstated as a business model for the future?

The case for a renewed commitment to the stakeholders that bestow legitimacy on businesses is a compelling one, even to many who benefit mightily from the current state of affairs.

The issue, and the formidable challenge, resides in the means to bring about this transformation of financially driven businesses into “purpose-driven” corporations.

To do so, we need a shift in the ideological underpinning of our economic system – a widespread epiphany about what will be our collective fate and that of future generations if we continue on our present course.

[1] http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2362454]]></content>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Davos Forum 2014</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/the-davos-forum-2014/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/the-davos-forum-2014/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2014 14:14:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Press Releases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chairman of the Board]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[World Economic Forum]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aimta712.org/?p=1405</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Dr. Yvan Allaire, Executive Chair of the Institute for Governance (IGOPP) and Chair of the Council on the role of business- World Economic Forum, has moderated a session entitled “CEO Dialogue on the Role of Business” organised by the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2014. This session was attended by more than 100 CEO. To [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Dr. Yvan Allaire, Executive Chair of the Institute for Governance (IGOPP) and Chair of the Council on the role of business- World Economic Forum, has moderated a session entitled “CEO Dialogue on the Role of Business” organised by the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2014. This session was attended by more than 100 CEO.

To find out more about the topics covered, please review the context paper below prepared by Dr. Allaire.

The Global Council brings together some 17 influential leaders from the world of international business, elite universities and the media. Professor Allaire has been a member of this Global Council since 2010 and was a panelist at the Davos Forum in 2010 and 2011.

Dr. Allaire has made several game-changing proposals about the international financial system in recent books co-authored with Professor Mihaela Firsirotu:

 	A Capitalism of Owners [1]
 	Black Markets and Business Blues [2] (Silver Medal of the American Independent Publishers Association)
 	Plaidoyer pour un nouveau capitalisme [3]


[1] http://www.amazon.ca/Capitalism-Financial-Markets-Companies-Societies/dp/2924055008
[2] http://www.amazon.ca/Black-Markets-Business-Blues-Capitalism/dp/2922285456/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&#38;ie=UTF8&#38;qid=1391627582&#38;sr=1-2&#38;keywords=black+markets+and+business
[3] http://www.renaud-bray.com/Livres_Produit.aspx?id=1108193&#38;def=Plaidoyer+pour+un+nouveau+capitalisme%2CALLAIRE%2C+YVAN%2CFIRSIROTU%2C+MIHAELA%2C9782981041081]]></content>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The future of corporate governance</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/the-future-of-corporate-governance/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/the-future-of-corporate-governance/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Nov 2013 15:54:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive compensation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[World Economic Forum]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aimta712.org/?p=1787</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Large corporations can and should play a significant role in how we deal with social and environmental issues. To do this, however, they need to focus on building long-term value for all stakeholders rather than focusing on delivering short-term returns to shareholders. When managers and board of directors of widely held, stock-market listed corporations look [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Large corporations can and should play a significant role in how we deal with social and environmental issues. To do this, however, they need to focus on building long-term value for all stakeholders rather than focusing on delivering short-term returns to shareholders.

When managers and board of directors of widely held, stock-market listed corporations look at the financial and governance landscape, what do they see?

 	A widespread belief (at least in Anglo-Saxon countries) that boards of directors have a legal responsibility to act solely in the interest of shareholders and that shareholder value creation is their sacred duty
 	A ritual of quarterly meetings with financially driven analysts, all about meeting expectations for earnings per share and growth in revenues
 	Speculators of all sorts who can, and do, play nasty games with the company’s stock (short-selling, total return swaps, puts and calls, etc.) or its public debt (credit derivative swaps, etc.)
 	The looming possibility of being targeted by “activist” hedge funds, if the company fails to meet financial expectations and create shareholder value
 	The monitoring of their corporate governance and executive compensation by proxy advisors with considerable influence on the election of board members
 	High turnover of shareholding, with a median holding time of under two years for institutional investors and an overall average holding period of less than a year as a result of high-speed trading, etc.
 	Executive compensation systems, which in spite of all efforts are still considered by many as aberrant and based on measures that reward short-term performance

Senior executives may well believe in the need to broaden the horizon and the goals of the corporation. But the diktats of financial markets and typical executive compensation linked to stock price will convince them of the wisdom of a rising stock price and ever-growing earnings per share. All other stated goals become secondary, lip service or good public relations.

Until some pretty fundamental changes are made to this system, widely held, listed corporations will not, cannot really, pursue long-term strategies beneficial to all stakeholders, and society at large.

Some changes: who owns the company?

An important change, or rather a clarification, relates to the fundamental question: to whom are company directors and managers accountable?

The pat answer, of course, is shareholders. But this shareholder primacy is largely a myth.

Legal statutes and precedents in several countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom and several states of the United States, establish that boards have to make decisions “in the long-term interest of the company” (Canada) and “that the directors must exercise their business judgment and decide what is in the corporation’s long-term interests” (USA). Company law in the United Kingdom is even more explicit, stating that company directors “must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.”

Indeed, boards of directors in many countries actually have a legal authority they rarely exercise or are frightened to use: to act in the long-term interest of the company and its various stakeholders.

Corporate citizenship

Several other measures would likely change the pernicious dynamics just described. For instance, in all decent societies, newcomers must wait a period of time before acquiring full citizenship and the right to vote. Tourists, for example, don’t vote. Why not institute a form of corporate citizenship whereby shareholders acquire the right to vote only after one year of ownership and “tourist shareholders” do not get to vote?

Why do institutional investors continue to be hostile towards dual-class shares, a capital structure in companies such as Berkshire-Hathaway, Google, Facebook, The New York Times and Netflix? This form of ownership, when structured in a way that protects minority shareholders, provides continuity of control for entrepreneurs, protects long-term planning and makes the company impervious to short-term financial games.

Alternatively, why not allow companies to limit, through their charter, the percentage of votes which may be exercised, irrespective of the percentage of shares owned. For instance, Nestlé, operating under Swiss corporate law, has limited voting rights to 5%.

Why not give corporations the possibility to calibrate dividends according to holding period, as is possible under French corporate law? What if governments were to set tax on capital gains on a sliding scale, decreasing as holding periods increase?

Compensation

The forms and levels of executive compensation have often turned management into well-paid servants of shareholders addicted to stock price rushes.

Why not eliminate executive compensation directly linked to share prices? At the very least, let’s eliminate yearly grants of options and restricted shares as well as the weakest link of the whole system: setting compensation on the basis of what a set of comparator companies pay their own executives.

Large companies should attend to the needs of several constituencies, including investors. But that will not happen, really happen, unless changes are brought to the sort of financial capitalism which has come to dominate the economic functioning of societies.
]]></content>
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		<item>
		<title>Five years on from the financial crisis, what has changed?</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/five-years-on-from-the-financial-crisis-what-has-changed/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/five-years-on-from-the-financial-crisis-what-has-changed/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Sep 2013 20:07:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial crisis]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[World Economic Forum]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aimta712.org/?p=1839</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Five years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Forum:Blog will be publishing a number of personal views by key figures on the event and its implications. The views expressed are those of the author, not necessarily the World Economic Forum. A great deal of pain was inflicted on ordinary, innocent people by the financial [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Five years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Forum:Blog will be publishing a number of personal views by key figures on the event and its implications. The views expressed are those of the author, not necessarily the World Economic Forum.

A great deal of pain was inflicted on ordinary, innocent people by the financial crisis, a crisis that was neither an act of God nor a perfect storm but a totally preventable, greed-fuelled tragedy.

The simmering crisis erupted on September 15th 2008 at 1h15 AM when lawyers for investment bank Lehman Brothers petitioned the U.S. court for protection under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. With liabilities of over $600 billion, it was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.

The Lehman bankruptcy triggered a lethal spiral. As liquidity and trust evaporated from the system and as the linkages among financial institutions became glaringly obvious, the whole financial system was revealed to be vulnerable and tottering. A wind of panic blew hard and cold. Politicians had no other choice but to throw public money at the banks and other financial firms to prevent a total meltdown of the international financial system.

The storm passed. In amazement and disbelief, the world looked at the extent of the devastation and the price that governments had to pay to contain the crisis. Then the real economies of almost all the developed countries went into a recessionary tailspin. Some governments introduced ill-advised austerity programs to repay some of the debts and further deepened their economic woes. Popular anger was and still is palpable and flammable.

Regulation post-crisis

Committees, commissions and books that have looked into the crisis have largely concurred on its causes: the massive deregulation of the financial system; the size and form of executive compensation; the use of poorly understood, esoteric financial “products”; rating agencies’ uncritical approach to those products; poor risk assessment methods; and accounting principles which turned out to be lethal in a crisis situation.

Proposals for new laws, regulatory frameworks and preventive measures gushed out from the G20, the European Union, Basel and Washington. In July 2010 the American Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, 800 pages of legislation aimed at giving additional powers to regulators.

After enduring a purgatory of vilification by lawmakers, pundits and lay people, the financial industry began to push back. A different twist was given to the causes of the crisis, a twist that emphasized the reckless behaviour of people with little means wanting to live beyond their financial capability.

Wall Street quickly realized that not much had changed in how the American political process operated. The implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act has been slowed down by political manoeuvring and court challenges. Key parts of the Act remain in limbo, and reformist enthusiasm in Congress is gradually subsiding.

Five years on from Lehman and more than three years after the enactment of Dodd-Frank:

 	Derivative products are but partly regulated;
 	Other than an advisory say-on-pay vote by shareholders and the eventual publication of the ratio of CEO compensation to the employee median compensation, executive pay levels and practices remain practically unchanged;
 	The “Volker rule”, to prohibit banks from trading in the markets on their own account and restrict their activities involving private equity and hedge funds, remains inoperative;
 	The rating agencies have retained most of their prerogatives;
 	Systemically important financial institutions have been identified and will eventually be subjected to capital-adequacy rules and other measures to limit the risk they represent for the financial system as a whole;
 	The limitations of corporate governance in large complex organizations – the asymmetry of information, expertise and knowledge between the board and management – remain unaddressed.

Slow-paced, stumbling, diluted, yet a financial system reform is taking shape and will eventually reduce the risk of a crisis with the same dynamics as the last one; it may be the equivalent of building the Maginot Line after WWI ! But the character of the international financial system is fundamentally unchanged; the motivations that drive the system remain as they were before the crisis. That may be a harbinger of crises to come.

What should be done?

Space here does not allow for an extensive consideration of measures that may go to the root of the causes; but here’s a sketchy set of proposals:

 	It must be noted, and it is not a coincidence, that all firms involved in the financial crisis were widely-held, stock-market traded corporations; a particular nexus of risk-rewarding compensation systems, soaring complexity and weak board governance has come to characterize this form of ownership; but for the last twenty years, all investment banks were organized as partnerships; would partners have taken the risks that Bear Stearns, Lehman, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs eventually took on as publicly traded companies? Publicly traded firms should not be allowed to take on more complexity than a competent board can govern effectively.
 	Corporations must take on a broader role than delivering ever growing quarterly earnings per share; yet, the whole framework of impatient and transient shareholding, proxy advisory firms, and activist hedge funds make it very difficult to pursue any objective other than the satisfaction of the financial markets; it would be productive to adopt measures to motivate longer term holding of shares (different vote structure, enhanced dividend after a period of years, et,) as well as alternative forms of ownership, like dual class of shares, cooperative undertaking, private ownership. In this way, companies might be insulated somewhat from short-term pressures and again plan and manage for the long term, which implies due consideration to all stakeholder that give legitimacy to a business firm.
 	The legal framework for corporation should make clear that the board must act and decide in the long-term interest of the corporation, which must include consideration of all stakeholders of the company.
 	Finally, let’s review the whole system for setting executive compensation; it is a broken system that needs retooling.

]]></content>
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		<title>The Institute for Governance at Davos Summit</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/the-institute-for-governance-at-davos-summit/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/the-institute-for-governance-at-davos-summit/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Jan 2011 19:09:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Press Releases]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aimta712.org/?p=1463</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In a document prepared for the World Economic Forum’s Global Council on the role of business in the 21rst century, Professor Yvan Allaire, chairman of the Institute for Governance (IGOPP) puts forth several proposals that would radically change the way capitalism works In a document prepared for the World Economic Forum’s Global Council on the [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[In a document prepared for the World Economic Forum’s Global Council on the role of business in the 21rst century, Professor Yvan Allaire, chairman of the Institute for Governance (IGOPP) puts forth several proposals that would radically change the way capitalism works

In a document prepared for the World Economic Forum’s Global Council on the role of business in the 21rst century, Professor Yvan Allaire, chairman of the Institute for Governance of Public and Private Organizations (IGOPP) puts forth several proposals that would radically change the way capitalism works.

These proposals will be discussed at the World Economic in Davos between January 26th and 30th.

The 16 members of this Global Council include CEOs of American, European, and Asian corporations as well as academics from several universities, including Harvard and top Chinese universities.

Mrs. Monique Leroux, chair and chief executive officer of the Mouvement Desjardins, has also joined the Council last year.
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		<title>Rethinking Values in the Post-Crisis World</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/rethinking-values-in-the-post-crisis-world/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/rethinking-values-in-the-post-crisis-world/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 15:40:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[Dr. Yvan Allaire’s presentation at the World Economic Forum 2010 &#8211; Davos summit.]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Dr. Yvan Allaire’s presentation at the World Economic Forum 2010 - Davos summit.
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		<title>The IGOPP at Davos in 2010 !</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/the-igopp-at-davos-in-2010/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/the-igopp-at-davos-in-2010/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2010 19:45:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Press Releases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Value-creating governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[World Economic Forum]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aimta712.org/?p=1471</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Professor Yvan Allaire, chair of the IGOPP’s board of directors, will participate at the upcoming World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Davos summit Professor Allaire was invited to join the WEF’s recently created “Global Agenda Council on the Role of Business,” following publication of his work Black Markets and Business Blues, (which he co-wrote with Professor Mihaela [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Professor Yvan Allaire, chair of the IGOPP’s board of directors, will participate at the upcoming World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Davos summit

Professor Allaire was invited to join the WEF’s recently created “Global Agenda Council on the Role of Business,” following publication of his work Black Markets and Business Blues, (which he co-wrote with Professor Mihaela Firsirotu)

This working group* was mandated to reflect on the role of businesses in society and to formulate action proposals with a global scope. The working group’s preliminary recommendations will be presented at the upcoming summit in Davos next January.

The Members of Global Agenda Council- WEF:

 	Yvan Allaire, Chair, IGOPP Canada
 	Dominic Barton, Worldwide Managing Director, McKinsey &#38; Company, United Kingdom
 	Samuel A. DiPiazza Jr, Chief Executive Officer (2001 2009),PricewaterhouseCoopers International, USA
 	William W. George, Professor of Management Practice, Harvard Business School, USA
 	Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Arbuckle Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, USA
 	Georg Kell, Executive Director, Global Compact Office, United Nations, New York
 	Jack Ma Yun, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Alibaba.com, People’s Republic of China
 	Takeshi Niinami, President and Chief Executive Officer, Lawson, Japan
 	Indra Nooyi, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, PepsiCo, USA ; Member of the Foundation Board of the World Economic Forum
 	Tarek Sultan Al Essa, Chairman and Managing Director, Agility, Kuwait
 	Werner Wenning, Chairman of the Board of Management, Bayer, Germany

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