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	<title>IGOPPPublic governance &#8211; IGOPP</title>
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		<title>SAP and IBM Unit Ensnared in $800 Million Quebec IT Fiasco</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/sap-and-ibm-unit-ensnared-in-800-million-quebec-it-fiasco/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/sap-and-ibm-unit-ensnared-in-800-million-quebec-it-fiasco/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2025 14:18:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IGOPP Site web]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP in the Medias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IGOPP in the medias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Organismes publics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/sap-and-ibm-unit-ensnared-in-800-million-quebec-it-fiasco/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Software company SAP SE and an IBM Corp. subsidiary are embroiled in a C$1.1 billion ($810 million) technology boondoggle that triggered both a public inquiry and an anti-corruption investigation in Quebec. The Canadian province’s Treasury Board President Sonia LeBel also ordered Quebec’s procurement watchdog to conduct an “in-depth analysis” of how the government awards technology [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Software company SAP SE and an IBM Corp. subsidiary are embroiled in a C$1.1 billion ($810 million) technology boondoggle that triggered both a public inquiry and an anti-corruption investigation in Quebec.

The Canadian province’s Treasury Board President Sonia LeBel also ordered Quebec’s procurement watchdog to conduct an “in-depth analysis” of how the government awards technology contracts, she announced Monday. The mandate came after the ongoing inquiry revealed cost overruns, potential conflicts of interest and unexplained contracts for a bungled IT upgrade.

[...]

The Quebec project began in 2017, when the province’s automobile insurance board, the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec, began modernizing its IT system. SAP and IBM’s LGS subsidiary were lead advisers under an entity called Alliance, and the overhaul was initially budgeted at C$638 million.

The result was SAAQclic, a new platform for booking driving tests and renewing driver’s licenses. It crashed when it launched in 2023, leading to long lines in SAAQ offices and sparking outrage across Quebec, as well as a provincial audit.

[...]

Alexandra Langelier, executive vice president with the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations, said the inquiry is an essential exercise in determining whether the board asked “questions at the right time” and understood the complexity of IT implementations.

Read more [1]

[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-18/saaqclic-inquiry-sap-and-ibm-unit-ensnared-in-800-million-it-fiasco]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Caisse bows out of Montreal light rail project</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/caisse-bows-out-of-montreal-light-rail-project/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/caisse-bows-out-of-montreal-light-rail-project/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 May 2022 17:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IGOPP Site web]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP in the Medias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IGOPP in the medias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Organismes publics;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/caisse-bows-out-of-montreal-light-rail-project/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Canadian pension fund giant Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec is stepping away from a proposed new $10-billion light rail line in eastern Montreal after encountering seemingly insurmountable difficulties with the design of the downtown portion of the project. Quebec and Montreal will take over leadership of the venture, the two governments said in [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Canadian pension fund giant Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec is stepping away from a proposed new $10-billion light rail line in eastern Montreal after encountering seemingly insurmountable difficulties with the design of the downtown portion of the project.

Quebec and Montreal will take over leadership of the venture, the two governments said in a joint statement Monday. They vowed to push on with modified plans for the transit line, calling it essential for the quality of life of citizens and for the growth of companies in the city’s east end.

The province gave the Caisse a mandate for detailed planning of the project, known as REM de l’Est, in 2020. It was initially conceived as a 32-kilometre automated light-rail system linking the eastern and northeastern areas of Montreal Island to the downtown core. Parts of the territory covered by the proposed network are former industrial lands that have fallen into neglect and political leaders are hoping a robust transit link will breathe new life and investment into the area.

Opposition to the conception and design the Caisse proposed has been widespread, however. Urban planners and citizens charged that the section of the rail line cutting into downtown Montreal would disfigure the city because much of it would be above ground. Montreal’s regional transit authority said it would siphon ridership and revenue from existing transit networks while attracting a limited number of new clients.

“We’ve concluded that the section into downtown has to be withdrawn,” because there is no social acceptability for it, Quebec Premier François Legault said at a news conference Monday. Removing the downtown section changes the project’s financial scope for the Caisse because the pension fund was counting on that traffic into the centre of the city, he said.

“They don’t want to pursue this project any more and I understand that,” Mr. Legault said of the Caisse. “That doesn’t mean there won’t be other projects.” The government continues to work with the pension fund manager to analyze other transit line possibilities, notably in Longueuil on Montreal’s South Shore, he said.

[ ... ]

Ending its involvement with the REM de l’Est shouldn’t hurt the Caisse in its efforts to strike other infrastructure deals, said Patric Besner, vice-president at Montreal’s Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations. If there had been another solution for the return on investment it was comfortable with, “I’m pretty sure that the Caisse would have found a way” to move forward, he said.

Read more [1]

[1] https://mcusercontent.com/d1c76e2e88e07148ab7072c66/files/51e41b12-a26d-75a0-ecdf-4f3a8866af86/The_Globe_and_Mail_Caisse_bows_out_of_Montreal_light_rail_project_May_2022.pdf]]></content>
		<wfw:commentRss>https://igopp.org/en/caisse-bows-out-of-montreal-light-rail-project/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Using International Comparisons to Guide Performance Improvement: Implications for Governance</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/international-comparisons-performance-implications-for-governance/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/international-comparisons-performance-implications-for-governance/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Oct 2017 21:15:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IGOPP Site web]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations ]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public health governance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/international-comparisons-performance-implications-for-governance/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Presentation made in October 2017,  by Eric C. Schneider, Senior Vice President for Policy and Research of the Commonwealth Fund, for the Conference on the governance of the healthcare system, organised by the Institut for Governance (IGOPP).]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Presentation made in October 2017,  by Eric C. Schneider, Senior Vice President for Policy and Research of the Commonwealth Fund, for the Conference on the governance of the healthcare system, organised by the Institut for Governance (IGOPP).
]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The tough job of University rector in Quebec</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/the-tough-job-of-university-rector-in-quebec/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/the-tough-job-of-university-rector-in-quebec/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Jul 2017 20:10:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IGOPP Site web]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP in the Medias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IGOPP in the medias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance of universities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Independence of Board members]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/?p=8470/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There’s been a substantial turnover of university leaders recently in Quebec, and finding replacements has sometimes proven difficult. No fewer than nine university institutions in Quebec have seen their executive head depart since 2015. Several of the rectors – the term used for university presidents in Quebec – left their posts after a single mandate [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[There’s been a substantial turnover of university leaders recently in Quebec, and finding replacements has sometimes proven difficult.

No fewer than nine university institutions in Quebec have seen their executive head depart since 2015. Several of the rectors – the term used for university presidents in Quebec – left their posts after a single mandate or partway through one. Is it that tough being a rector?

[ ... ]

Unlike in the rest of Canada, the process to select and appoint a rector is entirely open in Quebec, which could explain the complexity of renewing mandates. This is the opinion of Yvan Allaire, executive chair of the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations, an initiative of HEC Montréal and Concordia University’s John Molson School of Business. The possibility of a candidate for rector being defeated in a very public vote has discouraged a good many people from outside the institution from applying, he said.

Dr. Allaire added that this way of doing things has the effect of entrenching the status quo. “It’s hard for a candidate to propose massive changes because the very profs, students and administrators who elected him or her end up defending their own interests,” he explained.

In 2017, the institute decided that faculty unions and students should be consulted beforehand and help define the ideal candidate profile, but that the new rector should be confidentially appointed by a board of directors consisting chiefly of independent directors. “The faculty union refused point blank,” said Dr. Allaire. “They feared a loss of control and the infiltration of private business into the board of directors.”

Read more [1]

[1] http://www.universityaffairs.ca/news/news-article/tough-job-university-rector-quebec/]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Are our State-owned enterprises well governed?</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/are-our-state-owned-enterprises-well-governed/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/are-our-state-owned-enterprises-well-governed/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jun 2017 17:00:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IGOPP Site web]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News and Media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Press Releases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chairman of the Board]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gouvernance créatrice de valeurs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indépendance des administrateurs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Independence of Board members]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Value-creating governance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/?p=8166/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Montreal, June 8, 2017 – The Institute for Governance (IGOPP) is unveiling today the results of a study about the quality of governance at 46 Quebec State-owned enterprises, which collectively have revenues of $63 billion, employ some 65,000 people, receive more than $4 billion in subsidies and generate more than $4 billion in dividends for the [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Montreal, June 8, 2017 – The Institute for Governance (IGOPP) is unveiling today the results of a study about the quality of governance at 46 Quebec State-owned enterprises, which collectively have revenues of $63 billion, employ some 65,000 people, receive more than $4 billion in subsidies and generate more than $4 billion in dividends for the government.

Given their economic and fiscal role, it is important to assess the overall governance of these organizations, the make-up of their boards, their transparency, their adherence to best practices.

The governance score given to each State-owned enterprise is based on 47 variables selected to assess four different aspects of governance: (1) Board composition and structure (26% of total score); (2) Dynamic of board meetings (14%); (3) Qualifications of board members and their appointment/selection process (31%); and (4) Transparency, disclosure and accountability (29%).

These are summary findings:

 	Quebec State-owned enterprises achieved grades for governance ranging from 25% to 87%;
 	A significant difference is noted between those organizations which are subjected to the Quebec law on governance of State-owned enterprises enacted in 2006 versus those which are not;
 	Only half of the 46 State-owned enterprises in this study achieved a passing grade (60% and up).

These results lead to specific recommendations addressed in part to the Quebec government and in part to the boards of directors of State-owned enterprises.

The Quebec government should review and amend the outdated statutes governing several corporations so that all are required to implement best governance practices.

All boards of directors should adopt high-level governance principles and processes, even if not called for by their legal statute, provided that they do not thereby infringe the statute's requirements.

All boards should review their governance score and take measures to swiftly improve their score.

It is noteworthy that, with few exceptions, State-owned enterprises do not divulge the profile of expertise and experience they have set for their board, do not, in many cases, provide complete biographies of their board members, and rarely make public the relationship between the profile of expertise set for the board and the individual biographies of board members. Such disclosure has now become inescapable for any corporation listed on an exchange.

Finally, the information on the compensation of executive officers is often incomplete and, too often, their websites are not user-friendly making it difficult to access information on their governance, their financial results, their strategic plan and whatever performance indicators they use to monitor management.

For any information or to request an interview: 

Majida Lamnini
 Director, Strategic Initiatives, IGOPP &#124; 514.439.9301 &#124; mlamnini@igopp.org [1] &#124;www.igopp.org

[1] https://igopp.orgmailto:mlamnini@igopp.org]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Corporate Governance: looking backward, looking forward</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/corporate-governance-looking-backward-forward/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/corporate-governance-looking-backward-forward/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 07 Dec 2016 16:34:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Publications ]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reports & Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hostile takeovers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/?p=6909</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Once upon a time, the governance of publicly listed corporations was a friendly, fraternal affair with few requirements and little risk. Then, during the 1980s, a group of funds (leveraged buyout funds) sprouted up claiming that this sort of governance deprived shareholders of the full economic value of the business they had invested in. Cozy [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[Once upon a time, the governance of publicly listed corporations was a friendly, fraternal affair with few requirements and little risk. Then, during the 1980s, a group of funds (leveraged buyout funds) sprouted up claiming that this sort of governance deprived
shareholders of the full economic value of the business they had invested in. Cozy boards and complacent management, these funds claimed, were not motivated to maximize value for shareholders.

Their solution was a dramatic one: this system must be changed by a "revolution" in governance made possible only by the full privatization of these companies. Having access to large pools of funds and the borrowing capacity of the targeted companies, these LBO “revolutionaries” carried out a wave of hostile takeovers of companies and their subsequent privatization. That period was unusual for the large number of transactions – nearly always hostile – to privatize public companies.

This "revolution", which was to some degree successful and did leave a lasting impact on corporate governance, eventually faded away as a result of two events at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s:

 	The financing of these LBO transactions relied heavily on another "innovation", namely junk bonds, whose principal protagonist was Michael Milken. However, at the end of the 1980s, a series of financial scandals implicated several major actors in the
financial world, including Milken himself who was charged and eventually served jail time. This criminal turn of events had the effect of immediately drying up the junk bonds market as a source of financing for LBOs.
 	Legislators in 30 or so U.S. states, prompted by an electorate that was shocked and outraged by the impact on their communities of these hostile "privatizations", adopted laws giving boards of directors increased authority and leverage to repel any
unwanted takeover bids.

However, stung by the arguments of LBO funds, boards of directors would henceforth set compensation of senior executives in a way that would motivate them to create economic value for shareholders. That meant, inter alia, generous helpings of stock options so that management would work hard to push up the stock price, pleasing shareholders and ipso facto enriching themselves.

This radical change in executive compensation was strongly supported, and even instigated, at the time by institutional investors. As executive compensation shot up, public companies, beginning in 1992, were obliged to disclose detailed information about the compensation of their five best-paid executives.

Thus, during the 1990s, hostile takeover bids quickly dried up and were replaced by transactions that had become "friendly"1. The aggressive, “hostile” LBO funds morphed into “gentle” Private Equity Funds (PEF).

Board governance reverted to the quiet, collegial nature of the old days, but failing inexcusably to factor in the increased risk of management misbehaviour brought about by a system of compensation now loaded with stock options. This risk went unforeseen until the tornado known as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, et alia caught boards of directors by surprise in 2001.

The American political and regulatory system, sensing that accusations of laxity were forthcoming, adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in short order in July 2002. Thus, having interpreted the Enron/WorldCom scandals as being largely attributable to accounting flaws and management malpractices resulting from overly generous incentives, SOX imposed new safeguards, including the following:

 	Independence requirement for audit committee members;
 	Responsibility of audit committees for the quality of internal controls;
 	Explicit responsibility of the CEO and CFO to certify that the financial statements adequately represent the corporation's financial position;
 	Full disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions;
 	Creation of the Public Accounting Oversight Board;
 	Severe restrictions on other services that audit firms can provide to corporations for whom they assume audit responsibility;
 	More expeditious filing of insider trading reports;
 	The reimbursement of any variable compensation obtained according to financial statements that were subsequently restated;
 	The prohibition of loans to senior management and directors;
 	Longer prison terms for financial fraud.

Not only did the bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom lead to unusually long prison sentences for the officers of these corporations but board members were required to pay out of their own pockets fines of $13 million and $18 million respectively. Although there was no equivalent jail time or monetary fines in other cases, the Enron/WorldCom sagas triggered a shock wave among the officers and board members of U.S. public corporations.

Having to comply with the SOX requirements, worried about the risks they now ran for any laxity in governance, submerged under an avalanche of measures, standards and principles of "good governance" put forth by committees of experts, security commissions and the stock exchanges, boards of directors engaged in a sweeping reform of the governance of public corporations. Boards would henceforth play their role fully and assert a new (or renewed) fiduciary authority over corporate management.

This phenomenon, which first appeared in the U.S., spread like wildfire to Canada and the United Kingdom, and then more slowly to other developed countries. Read more [1]

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.

[1] https://igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/IGOPP_Rapport_CorporateGovernance_EN_v1.pdf]]></content>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Reality check: Will new foreign ownership rules make flights in Canada cheaper?</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/new-foreign-rules-make-flights-cheaper/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/new-foreign-rules-make-flights-cheaper/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Nov 2016 15:07:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[IGOPP in the Medias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IGOPP in the medias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance of airports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stakeholders]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://igopp.org/new-foreign-rules-make-flights-cheaper-2/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[One such fee is the landing and parking fee charged to airlines – a fee often passed down to consumers. And flights landing in Canada pay some of the highest fees in the world, according to a 2014 report from the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations entitled The Governance of Canadian Airports. [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[One such fee is the landing and parking fee charged to airlines – a fee often passed down to consumers. And flights landing in Canada pay some of the highest fees in the world, according to a 2014 report from the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations entitled The Governance of Canadian Airports.

See the video [1]

 [2]

[1] http://globalnews.ca/news/3044852/fact-check-will-canadians-pay-less-for-flights/
[2] http://globalnews.ca/news/3044852/fact-check-will-canadians-pay-less-for-flights/]]></content>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Governance of Canadian Airports</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/the-governance-of-canadian-airports-issues-and-recommendations/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/the-governance-of-canadian-airports-issues-and-recommendations/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 20:03:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Reports & Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance of airports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stakeholders]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aimta712.org/?p=1714</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[According to a study made public by the Institute for Governance (IGOPP), Canadian airports, which are public assets with a quasi-monopolistic position in their respective markets should be subjected to an independent review process of their decisions concerning major investments and tariff increases. Ever since Ottawa’s decision to transfer the management of airport facilities to [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[According to a study made public by the Institute for Governance (IGOPP), Canadian airports, which are public assets with a quasi-monopolistic position in their respective markets should be subjected to an independent review process of their decisions concerning major investments and tariff increases.

Ever since Ottawa’s decision to transfer the management of airport facilities to regional organizations, it is not clear to whom Canadian airports’ boards of directors are accountable. Canadian airports are important drivers of local and regional economies, but are losing market share to American airports operating close to the Canadian border. The study suggests that in order to strengthen the integration of airports into regional economies it might be advisable for the Canadian government to complete the process of “devolution” of airport management by offering the provinces and municipalities the possibility of acquiring the airport facilities. Of course, Ottawa would retain its strategic responsibilities for customs, immigration and air transportation safety.

This study was conducted by Professor Jacques Roy of HEC Montréal and Michel Nadeau, Executive Director of the IGOPP.

Dr. Yvan Allaire, the Executive Chair of the IGOPP’s board of directors, emphasizes that “This research is not meant to be a criticism of the management of Canadian airports but an assessment of their governance systems, their accountability and alternative forms of ownership.”

Under the current system, various public and private organizations select most members of the boards of directors of the airport authorities. But it is not clear to whom these directors are accountable. As the owner of the facilities, Transport Canada requires some reporting but its main concern seems to be ensuring that the rent for the facilities is duly paid. The boards of directors of airports have a significant decision-making authority in many areas, such as setting airport improvement fees to be paid by passengers, aircraft landing and take-off fees, infrastructure investments, and so on.

Despite considerable investments of several billion dollars over the last 10 years, the Canadian airports have not always risen to expectations with respect to regional economic development and have not succeeded in stopping the flow of Canadian travellers toward the cross-border airports where ticket prices are lower.

If ownership of the facilities were transferred to the provinces or municipalities, the airports would no longer have to pay rents to the federal government but instead would have to pay for the public capital invested.

A recent report of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications raised the same issues concerning the governance of Canadian airports.
]]></content>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Governance of Canadian Airports</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/gouvernance-des-aeroports-au-canada/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/gouvernance-des-aeroports-au-canada/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 15:38:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Press Releases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance of airports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stakeholders]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aimta712.org/gouvernance-des-aeroports-au-canada-2/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[According to a study made public by the Institute for Governance (IGOPP), Canadian airports, which are public assets with a quasi-monopolistic position in their respective markets should be subjected to an independent review process of their decisions concerning major investments and tariff increases. Ever since Ottawa’s decision to transfer the management of airport facilities to [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[According to a study made public by the Institute for Governance (IGOPP), Canadian airports, which are public assets with a quasi-monopolistic position in their respective markets should be subjected to an independent review process of their decisions concerning major investments and tariff increases.

Ever since Ottawa’s decision to transfer the management of airport facilities to regional organizations, it is not clear to whom Canadian airports’ boards of directors are accountable. Canadian airports are important drivers of local and regional economies, but are losing market share to American airports operating close to the Canadian border. The study suggests that in order to strengthen the integration of airports into regional economies it might be advisable for the Canadian government to complete the process of “devolution” of airport management by offering the provinces and municipalities the possibility of acquiring the airport facilities. Of course, Ottawa would retain its strategic responsibilities for customs, immigration and air transportation safety.

This study was conducted by Professor Jacques Roy of HEC Montréal and Michel Nadeau, Executive Director of the IGOPP.

Dr. Yvan Allaire, the Executive Chair of the IGPPO’s board of directors, emphasizes that “This research is not meant to be a criticism of the management of Canadian airports but an assessment of their governance systems, their accountability and alternative forms of ownership.”

Under the current system, various public and private organizations select most members of the boards of directors of the airport authorities. But it is not clear to whom these directors are accountable. As the owner of the facilities, Transport Canada requires some reporting but its main concern seems to be ensuring that the rent for the facilities is duly paid. The boards of directors of airports have a significant decision-making authority in many areas, such as setting airport improvement fees to be paid by passengers, aircraft landing and take-off fees, infrastructure investments, and so on.

Despite considerable investments of several billion dollars over the last 10 years, the Canadian airports have not always risen to expectations with respect to regional economic development and have not succeeded in stopping the flow of Canadian travellers toward the cross-border airports where ticket prices are lower.

If ownership of the facilities were transferred to the provinces or municipalities, the airports would no longer have to pay rents to the federal government but instead would have to pay for the public capital invested.

A recent report of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications raised the same issues concerning the governance of Canadian airports.
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		<title>Five years after the adoption of Bill 53</title>
		<link>https://igopp.org/en/assessing-the-governance-of-quebec-government-owned-corporations/</link>
		<comments>https://igopp.org/en/assessing-the-governance-of-quebec-government-owned-corporations/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 May 2011 18:10:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mlamnini]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Press Releases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diversity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Independence of Board members]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public governance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aimta712.org/?p=1451</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In a new report the IGPPO recently assessed the progress of governance modernization efforts in Quebec state-owned corporations since the establishment of modern rules and new disclosure norms five years ago. According to the report, Quebec-government owned corporations have conformed well to the disclosure provisions of Bill 53, which was adopted in 2006. However the [&#8230;]]]></description>
		<content><![CDATA[In a new report the IGPPO recently assessed the progress of governance modernization efforts in Quebec state-owned corporations since the establishment of modern rules and new disclosure norms five years ago.

According to the report, Quebec-government owned corporations have conformed well to the disclosure provisions of Bill 53, which was adopted in 2006.

However the IGPPO believes that some improvements are needed. Bilan de la Gouvernance des Sociétés d’État, which was prepared by the IGPPO’s chairman Yvan Allaire, puts forward ten recommendations to improve governance quality:

The current law only targets 23 provincially-owned corporations however there are dozens of other organizations with large budgets that should be subject to greater transparency norms.

The law states that 2/3 of board members need to be independent, however the government still has not provided a definition of independence.

The boards of directors should make public profiles that list the expertise and competencies sought out in board members. The organization should also indicate how existing members’ qualifications rate relative to the targeted profile.

The IGPPO provides guidelines for analyzing candidacies from persons identified with the political party in power and/or who have continued financially to it.

State-owned corporations should all make public their strategic plans on the Internet and mention whether they have been approved by government.

The annual reports of state-owned corporations should be published quickly and the constraining requirement that these be tabled in the National Assembly while it is in session be removed, because this requirement imposes unnecessary delays.

The Internet sites of state owned corporations should include on the main page a button-link labeled “governance” where pertinent information can be found.

The government should better respect the governance of state-owned corporations and no longer repeat the experience of Bill 100, where specific budget cut measures were imposed without distinction between organizations. Each board of directors should decide on its own the organization’s way of contributing to the government’s objectives.

The Quebec government should consolidate its operations in a “State Ownership Agency,” through which politicians and civil servants can liaise with the heads of the state owned corporations.

The IGPPO wishes to highlight the exemplary efforts made by the government, which enabled the percentage of women on boards to increase from 27.5% to 45.8% in just 54 months. The parity objective as outlined in the law will thus likely be met by December 14, 2011.
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